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California Supreme Court Survey
August 1997 - June 1998
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent decisions by the
supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of issues that the supreme court has
addressed, as well as to serve as a starting point for researching any of the topical areas. Attorney
discipline, judicial misconduct, and death penalty appeal cases have been omitted from the survey.
Summaries provide a brief outline of the areas of law addressed in selected California Supreme
Court cases. Summaries are designed to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the legal
implications of cases in a concise format.
1. ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS, AND SURVEYORS
An architect may be disciplined for acts or omissions prior to licensure under
Business and Professions Code sections 5583 and 5584; although not licensed,
the architect was "in the practice of architecture"; such a construction is
consistent with the legislative intent as evidenced by the language of the code,
the statutory purpose of protecting the public, and the legislative history of the
code in general; thus discipline by the Board for pre-licensure acts is not a
violation of the Due Process clause or any other constitutional provisions.
Hughes v. Board of Examiners .............................. 689
I[. CIVIL RIGHTS
A. In order for an organization's membership decisions to be under the purview
of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, it must be a business establishment. A
charitable organization, with a social purpose not related to the promotion of
its member's economic interests, is not indicative of a business establishment.
An organization that offers members a program not equivalent to a traditional
place of public accommodation or amusement is not indicative of a business
establishment. An organization that does not sell its rights and activities to
nonmembers is not indicative of a business establishment.
Randall v. Orange County Council, Boy Scouts of Am. .......... 694
B. The Boy Scouts of America is not a "business organization of every kind
whatsoever" within the definition of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civil Code,
section 51); recovery is thus precluded under the Act for an individual who
was denied an assistant scoutmaster position because of his declared
homosexuality.
Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am ....... 699
HI. CONSUMER PROTECTION
The cost-shifting provision of the Song-Beverly Consumer WarrantyAct, which
allows plaintiffs to recover their costs, does not preclude recovery of costs by
prevailing defendants as provided for under California Code of Civil
Procedure sections 998 and 1032(b).
Murillo v. Fleetwood Enter., Inc . ............................ 704
IV. CORPORATIONS
"Stock Purchase Agreements," commonly referred to as "buy-sell agree-
ments, " which are silent as to the shareholder rights during the postemployme
nt period that is necessary to determine the value of shares, do not imply on
their faces an intention by the parties to deny the minority shareholders those
rights during postemployment.
Stephenson v. Drever ...................................... 708
V. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Where a person is convicted of any combination of at least three misdemeanor
violations that fall under the penumbra of California Vehicle Code section
23175, any similarfuture convictions that occur within seven years of the three
prior convictions will be subject to an enhanced penalty in accordance with
section 23175, regardless of the order in which the offenses were actually
committed. Additionally, increasing the penalty for a fourth violation from a
misdemeanor to a felony does not violate ex postfacto laws, regardless of the
fact that the fourth infraction occurred before the prior three triggering
violations, so long as the offense increasing the penalty occurred after the
effective date of section 23175 as amended in 1984.
People v. Snook .......................................... 713
B. The United States Supreme Court determined in Harris that evidence obtained
by a police officer who knowingly violates a defendant's Miranda rights may
still be used against the defendant at trial for impeachment purposes. The
Harris rule applies regardless of whether the police officer intentionally
violates the defendant's Miranda protections.
People v. Peevy ........................................... 719
C. Where a court has stayed a sentence on an otherwise qualifying prior
conviction under California Penal Code section 654 because imposing the
sentence would constitute multiple punishment, it is within the discretion of a
trial court to later treat the stayed conviction as a strike.
People v. Benson ......................................... 724
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D. A prior conviction does not have to be brought and tried separately from
another conviction in order to count as a separate strike under the three
strikes law. Additionally, a defendant must seek relief through a petition for
writ of habeas corpus when the record is silent as to whether the trial court
understood that it retained discretion under section 1385 to dismiss a prior
felony conviction.
People v. Fuhrm an ....................................... 728
E. A defendant may appeal a judgment of conviction entered on a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere without filing the required statement of grounds and
obtaining an executed certificate of probable cause from the trial court if the
defendant alleges solely that errors resulted in the trial court hearings for the
purpose of ascertaining the degree of the crime and penalty to impose and
does not challenge the validity of the plea. The notice of appeal must state
these grounds expressly or impliedly to become operative.
People v. Lloyd .......................................... 731
F. The failure of a prosecutor, or any agency acting on the prosecutor's behalf
to turn over possible exculpatory evidence to a defendant will be charged
against the prosecutor, despite any actual knowledge by the prosecution of
the evidence or any lack of bad faith by any party. The prosecutor has an
affirmative duty to search out exculpatory evidence and any failed attempt to
transmit the exculpatory evidence will not be sufficient to meet the due
process requirements that the rule is meant to protect. However, non-
disclosure will give rise to a denial of due process only when the evidence is
material.
In re Brow n ............................................. 734
G. A tort action ofpublic disclosure ofprivate facts against a television producer
is appropriately dismissed in summary judgment because coverage of a car
accident scene and helicopter rescue is 'newsworthy,' which acts as a
complete bar to a public disclosure action; however, the tort action of
intrusion may appropriately proceed because a reasonable jury could find
that the camera operator intruded into a private place, conversation, or
matter in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person; andfurther, news
organizations are not afforded the same First Amendment protections in news
gathering as are given when publishing news.
Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc ............................. 738
H. A prosecutor's duty to disclose witness information pursuant to California
Penal Code section 1054.1 is limited to "witnesses" and not information
regarding defense witnesses; thus, a prosecutor's failure to disclose
information regarding the witness' credibility is not discoverable and did not
violate the defendant's right to due process.
People v. Tillis .......................................... 743
The Kelly/Frye foundational testfor the admissibility of evidence based upon
new scientific technique is composed of three prongs. Thefirstprong, which
requires that reliability be established by showing that the technique has
gained general scientific acceptance, can be established if a previously
published appellate decision has already upheld the admissibility of that
technique. However, the third prong, which requires that the procedures
used in the instant case complied with those of the generally accepted
standard, is case specific and cannot rely on previously published decisions.
People v. Venegas ....................................... 746
VI. DAMAGES
A prepayment provision in a short-term loan between a construction loan
and a buyer's permanent loan is a penalty for delinquency in meeting the
contractual interest payments, and thus unenforceable, if it bears no
relationship to the potential damages the defendant would incur from a late
interest payment.
Ridgley v. Topa Thrift and Loan Ass'n ..................... 750
VII. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A spouse who contributes separate property to the acquisition of community
property is entitled to reimbursement upon dissolution of the marriage from
the original acquisition or community property that is traced from the
proceeds of the original property, absent a written waiver.
In re M arriage of W alrath ................................ 754
VIII. EMINENT DOMAIN
The California Coastal Commission's erroneous assertion of permit
jurisdiction over a lot line adjustment that prevented any economically
viable use of the property is merely a developmental delay and does not
constitute a regulatory taking of the property. Absent evidence that a delay
was caused by anything other than a bona fide dispute between the two
parties, a governmental mistake cannot be classified as a taking.
Landgate, Inc., v. California Coastal Comm'n ................ 759
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IX. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
Employees of an independent contractor who are injured by the contractor's
negligence cannot seek recovery in tort against the hiring person under the
peculiar risk doctrine because of the availability of workers' compensation
benefits.
Toland v. Sunland Hous. Group, Inc ......................... 763
X. LABOR
In an action by an employee to recover unpaid wages under California
Labor Code section 98, the statute of limitations date used to calculate
recoverable backpay should be the filing date of the claim rather than the
date on which the hearing is held.
Cuadra v. M illan ........................................ 767
XI. PARENT AND CHILD
A biological father does not have a constitutionally protected interest in
establishing a relationship with his child conceived and born during the
mother's marriage to another man; therefore, California Family Code
sections 7611 and 7630 may constitutionally be applied to preclude an
alleged biological father from establishing his paternity of a child born
during the mother's marriage to another man.
Dawn D. v. Superior Court ................................ 771
XII. TORTS
In cases where the victim of intentional destruction of evidence, committed
by a party to the underlying cause of action to which the evidence is
pertinent, knows or has constructive knowledge of the alleged act before the
trial pertaining to the underlying action, a new tort remedy will not be
created.
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Bowyer .......................... 777
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XII. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
A. An employee's injury must occur in the course of his employment and by
reason of a condition or incident of his employment to be covered under a
workers' compensation plan; thus, an employee's deadly injury from a
bacterial infection contracted in the hospital while receiving medical
treatment for a heart attack suffered during a business trip, did not occur in
the course of his employment or by reason of a condition or an incident of
that employment and, accordingly, was not compensable under the workers'
compensation law.
LaTourette v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd ............ 781
B. When the owner of a residential dwelling purchases comprehensive personal
liability insurance, the insurance policy must provide coverage for workers'
compensation benefits for any person employed by the owner whose duties
are incidental to the maintenance of the dwelling, who worked more than 52
hours and earned more than $100 during the 90 days proceeding the injury.
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Workers' Compensation
A ppeals Bd . ............................................ 785
688
[Vol. 26: 683, 1999] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
I. ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS, AND SURVEYORS
An architect may be disciplined for acts or omissions prior to licensure under
Business and Professions Code sections 5583 and 5584; although not licensed,
the architect was "in the practice of architecture"; such a construction is
consistent with the legislative intent as evidenced by the language of the code,
the statutory purpose of protecting the public, and the legislative history of the
code in general; thus discipline by the Board for pre-licensure acts is not a
violation of the Due Process clause or any other constitutional provisions.
Hughes v. Board of Examiners, Supreme Court of California, Decided March 26,
1998, 17 Cal. 4th 763, 952 P.2d 641, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624.
Facts. The respondent, Charles Scott Hughes, obtained a license to practice
architecture with the California Board of Architectural Examiners on September
10, 1990. Prior to his application, the respondent had successfully completed an
architectural examination in Washington D.C., but did not receive his license for
failure to satisfy all the requirements. He did, however, run his own architectural
firm and held himself out as a licensed architect, even passing off other licensed
architects' stamps as his own. Hughes also applied for membership to the
American Institute of Architects using another architect's registration certificate
and falsely representing that he was registered as an architect in other states. Upon
discovery of these actions, the Board of Architectural Examiners of Washington
began disciplinary proceedings against Hughes. A grand jury indicted Hughes on
one count of misrepresentation and Hughes was ordered to perform community
service. Eventually, the prosecutor dismissed the charge because Hughes had
complied with the court imposed conditions.
Prior to the dismissal of the case, Hughes applied to the California Board of
Architectural Examiners (the Board) and completed an application on which he
indicated that he had never been convicted of any offense (including offenses
dismissed for satisfaction of court imposed conditions). Soon after Hughes sent
the application, he wrote a supplemental letter in which he admitted that "he had
never completed the licensing process" and that he was involved in civil litigation
regarding his status as a licensed architect. He also related the events of the
litigation, including his satisfaction of the probation terms, and he indicated that the
charges against him had been dismissed (although technically, they were not
formally dismissed until May 1, 1990, about two weeks after Hughes wrote the
supplemental letter). Hughes obtained his license from the Board on September 10,
1990.
On February 5, 1992, the Board learned that Hughes had been denied
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registration in other states due to problems with his moral character. After an
investigation, the Board made the following accusations against Hughes: 1) that
he knowingly made a false statement on his application, 2) that he had been
convicted of "a crime substantially related to the qualifications, functions, and
duties of an architect" in violation of section 5577; 3) that he had engaged in fraud
and deceit in the practice of architecture in violation of section 5583; and 4) that
he was guilty of willful misconduct in the practice of architecture in violation of
section 5584. In response to these allegations, an administrative law judge ordered
that Hughes' license be revoked. The Board adopted this resolution and revoked
Hughes' license on June 16, 1993. Hughes filed a petition for a peremptory writ
of mandate in the superior court soon after.
The superior court denied Hughes' petition, holding that Business and
Professions Code sections 5583 and 5584 allowed the Board to take disciplinary
action for conduct occurring pre-licensure. The appellate court reversed and the
Supreme Court of California granted review to consider "whether an architect may
be disciplined for misconduct occurring before a license is issued if the license was
not obtained by fraud or misrepresentation."
Holding. Sections 5583 and 5584 of the Business and Professions Code authorize
disciplinary proceedings against a licensed architect for conduct occurring prior to
licensure. Such an interpretation is consistent with the legislative purpose "to
regulate the practice of architecture in the interest and for the protection of the
public health, safety, and welfare." In reaching this conclusion, the court looked
at the Architects Practice Act as a whole, including the statutory intent and
legislative history.
Article 4 of the act governs the issuance of licenses and provides the basis for
denial of a certificate of registration. Article 5 allows the Board to suspend or
revoke a license for disciplinary reasons. Article 5 further specifies particular acts
or omissions for which a license may be revoked. Included in Article 5 are sections
5583 and 5584, which allow disciplinary proceedings for fraud, deceit, negligence,
and willful misconduct committed in the practice of architecture by the holder of
a license. Respondent Hughes argued that Articles 4 and 5 are mutually exclusive
based on the temporal distinction of pre and post licensure. Thus, he contended the
disciplinary proceedings authorized by Article 5 only apply to acts occurring when
the individual is actually licensed. Consequently, acts committed prior to licensure
would be relevant only during the application procedure as grounds on which to
deny licensure. The supreme court rejected this approach as inconsistent with the
statutory purpose and language of the act as a whole. While recognizing that the
statute is ambiguous, the court pointed to language in Article 5 indicating that the
Board may discipline a licensee if he "is practicing in violation of the provisions
of this chapter." This language suggests disciplinary proceedings may be initiated
against an individual for acts occurring prior to licensure as delineated in Article
4, as well as for acts occurring after licensure.
Further, the court pointed to the legislative history of the act, particularly the
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previous distinction made between a provisional and final certificate. Historically,
section 5 of the act authorized disciplinary proceedings against the holder of either
a provisional or a final certificate. Thus, section 5 allowed for disciplinary
proceedings for pre-licensure acts. As these sections were amended, the legislature
eliminated these distinctions; however, the court concluded that none of these
amendments were aimed at imposing temporal limitations on the reach of
disciplinary authority under Article 5. The court noted that the purpose of the
statute was to protect public welfare and thus it was subject to broad interpretation.
The court further recognized that past conduct is important in determining the
fitness of a person in a particular profession.
Additionally, the court held that allowing the Board to revoke a license for
acts committed prior to obtaining a license would not violate the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although recognizing that the
holder of a license has a vested fundamental right, the court reiterated that this only
guarantees him certain procedural protections which are satisfied by the procedural
requirements contained in the Act. Further, the act is not subject to strict review
because the purpose of the Act is to regulate the practice of architecture, not to
punish the individual. Accordingly, giving the Board power to discipline licensees
for acts inconsistent with the general standards and qualifications of the profession,
even those occurring prior to licensure, helps protect the public.
Finally, the court rejected the respondent's claim that the court's construction
violated established jurisdictional principles. The court held that "conduct
occurring anywhere... may provide the basis for such denial without offending
jurisdictional principles." The court also concluded that the applicable statutes
were not being applied retroactively because they had been in effect since 1941.
Subsequently, the court rejected the respondent's equitable and collateral estoppel
arguments as inapplicable to the current circumstances. The court recognized that
applying equitable estoppel "would defeat the strong public policy of regulating the
architectural profession." The doctrine of collateral estoppel was also inappropri-
ate because the Board had not made a final decision in an adversarial hearing. Yet
the court cautioned the Board that it may not "defer to the post-licensure phase its
examination of questions raised concerning an applicant's background" and that
in different circumstances, the doctrines of estoppel or laches might apply.
REFERENCES
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U.S. CONST. amend. V (the federal government cannot deprive an individual "of
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disciplinary action where the holder of a license has been guilty of fraud or deceit
in the practice of architecture).
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disciplinary action where the holder of a license has been guilty of negligence or
willful misconduct in the practice of architecture).
Case Law:
Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 33 Cal. 3d 392, 657 P.2d 383, 188
Cal. Rptr. 891 (1983) (discussing different standards of review for vested and non-
vested rights in licensing situations).
Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal. 4th 1,960 P.2d 1031,
78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (1998) (specifying the standard of review for administrative
interpretations as independent judgment).
Clayton v. Superior Ct., 67 Cal. App. 4th 28, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 750 (1998)
(reiterating that judicial construction of statutes is aimed at giving effect to their
statutory purpose. Provisions should be interpreted in regards to the subject matter
as a whole).
Legal Texts:
3 B.E. WrrKiN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions § 27(b) (4thed. 1996) (discussing
the nature of certain disciplinary proceedings by licensing boards as quasi-criminal,
but noting that they are not governed by rules of criminal procedure).
9 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Administrative Proceedings § 3 (4th ed.
1997 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing due process and other constitutional
limits on administrative proceedings).
8 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs § 285 (4th ed. 1997)
(providing examples of vested rights, including the right to an existing license or
permit).
11 CAL. JUR. 3d Business and Occupation Licenses § 46 (1996 & Supp. 1998)
(discussing power to revoke license for grounds substantially related to the
qualifications, functions, and duties of the profession).
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11 CAL. JUR. 3d Business and Occupational Licenses § 47 (1996) (discussing
procedural due process requirements in the administrative area).
11 CAL. JUR. 3d Business and Occupational Licenses § 9 (1996) (indicating that
the substance and purpose are controlling in interpreting a statute. All provisions
are construed together in regards to the act in its entirety).
6 CAL. JUR. 3d Architects § 12 (1998) (discussing the grounds for revocation of a
license).
6 CAL. JUR. 3dArchitects § 13 (1998) (discussing the procedure for revocation and
other disciplinary actions).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Sam Walker, Judicially Created Uncertainty: The Past, Present, and Future of the
California Writ of Mandamus, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 783 (1991) (examining the
historical development of the writ in judicial review of administrative actions and
the relevant standard of review).
Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California
Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157 (1995) (generally discussing the
authority of administrative review agencies and judicial review thereof).
Mark R. Fondacaro & Dennis P. Stolle, Revoking Motor Vehicle and Profession
Licenses for Purposes of Child Support Enforcement: Constitutional Challenges
and Policy Implications, 5 CoRNELLJ. L. & PUB. POL'Y 355 (1996) (discussing the
Due Process Clause as applied to revocation of professional and driver's licenses).
Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044
(1984) (delineating the difference between substantive and procedural due process
issues as applied to administrative actions).
JULIE TROTTER
II. CIVIL RIGHTS
A. In order for an organization's membership decisions to be under the
purview of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, it must be a business establishment. A
charitable organization, with a social purpose not related to the promotion of
its member's economic interests, is not indicative of a business establishment.
An organization that offers members a program not equivalent to a traditional
place of public accommodation or amusement is not indicative of a business
establishment. An organization that does not sell its rights and activities to
nonmembers is not indicative of a business establishment.
Randall v. Orange County Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Decided March 23, 1998,
17 Cal. 4th 736, 952 P.2d 261, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453.
Facts. The plaintiffs, Michael and William Randall, were in the Cub Scout pack
in Culver City. The plaintiffs testified that they did not repeat the word "God"
when reciting the Cub Scout Promise and that their den leader allowed the boys to
refrain from doing so after they explained they did not believe in God. However,
the den leader testified that the boys neither raised questions about their belief in
God, nor did they refrain from omitting any portion of the promise. The plaintiffs
advanced from "Tiger Cub" to "Bobcat" to "Wolf' rank, while participating in the
Cub Scout pack in Culver City. The Randall family moved to Anaheim Hills in
Orange County and the boys joined Cub Scout Den 4, affiliated with Pack 519 and
a part of the defendant Orange County Council. In an effort to obtain the rank of
"Bear," the plaintiffs were required to fulfill a requirement necessitating the
advancement of their religion in 1990. The material provided to the boys stated the
following: "We are lucky the people who wrote and signed our Constitution were
very wise. They understood the need of Americans to worship God as they choose.
A member of your family will be able to talk to you about your duty to God.
Remember, this achievement is part of your Cub Scout Promise. 'I, _, promise to
do my best to do my duty to God and my country."' Moreover, the boys were
called upon to: "Practice your religion as you are taught in your home, church,
synagogue, mosque or other religious community." The boys notified their den
leader that they did not believe in God. Thereafter, the den leader notified the
boys' mother that the belief in God was a necessity for completing the den
requirement. The defendants, Orange County Council and Boy Scouts of America,
affirmed that they could not allow the boys to advance unless they fulfilled their
duty to God.
The plaintiffs brought an action, through their mother as guardian ad litem,
alleging the defendants violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act because the boys were
denied equal access to an organization because of their religious beliefs. The
complaint sought statutory damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief
prohibiting any exclusion or impediment to participation in scouting activities.
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The court ordered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the Orange
County Council and agents from requiring plaintiffs to use the word "God" in any
pledge vow or from making advancement only available upon the completion of
religious requirements. The court also issued a preliminary injunction, which
offered the same relief and also prohibited the defendants from disallowing
advancement because the religious requirements were not completed. The
defendants appealed and the court of appeal granted a petition for writ of
supersedeas. However, before the matter could be ultimately resolved, the case
went to trial.
The first issue addressed at trial was whether the defendants operated as a
business establishment, thus subjecting them to the purview of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act. The plaintiffs argued in the affirmative, suggesting that the Orange
County Council operates as a business establishment. The bases for this argument
were that it maintained substantial holdings in real estate, employed 55 full time
employees and twelve part time employees, opened the operations of its commer-
cial establishments to the public, and conducted large-scale revenue-raising and
revenue-eaming activities. On the contrary, the defendants argued that the Orange
County Council was not, in fact, a business establishment. They offered evidence
that most of its income comes from charitable contributions, that its stores serve
members and produce no profit, that camp facilities are available for rental to
nonmembers for a nominal fee, that most programs are guided by volunteers, that
those employed serve the volunteers, and that volunteers make up the board of
governors.
The second issue pertinent to the case was if the defendants are under the
Unruh Civil Rights Act, would the prohibition of the defendants from excluding
the plaintiffs from membership and advancement in the organization violate the
defendants' rights of expression under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution. The plaintiffs adamantly argued that no constitutional
violation exists because religion is not an expressive function of the defendants.
First, the plaintiffs illustrated that religion plays a minimal role in Cub Scout
activities and that the social and recreational qualities of the club are the predomi-
nate attributes. The plaintiffs also pointed out that the Boy Scouts of America's
program activities expressly obviate the fact that religion is to be learned at their
home and at their particular religious organizations. In addition, the plaintiffs
noted that the United Way funded the defendants on the condition that funding and
funded programs would not be limited to those of a certain religious belief, and that
a religious activity could not be a condition precedent towards receiving any
service. The defendants accepted funding from United Way.
The defendants offered ample evidence supporting their expressive function
of advocating a religious message and spreading the message to the Cub Scouts.
The defendants pointed out that all applicants to the Cub Scouts must recognize a
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duty to God and are taught to carry out this duty. Furthermore, the Scout Law
requires that the scout be reverent and faithful in his religious duties. In addition,
the defendants supplied evidence that Boy Scouts of America instills religious
values by training adult leaders to encourage participation in religious programs
and church activities, to advocate the value of reverence for God, to recognize the
obligation to God, to reinforce the Scout Promise at den meetings, and to create a
protective environment in the Cub Scout program, whereby religious principles can
be taught. Other evidence presented showed that fifty percent of dens are
sponsored by religious organizations in the regional council's territory. There was
also testimony by Cub Scouts' parents supporting the emphasis of religious values
on the youth. Finally, the defendants argued that allowing nonbeliever members
would hinder efforts to teach the religious message.
Despite the significant amount of evidence offered by the defendants, the trial
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding statutory damages of $250 and
issuing a permanent injunction. The trial court held that the defendants are a
business establishment and are therefore subject to the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
With regard to the constitutional issues, the trial court found the evidence did not
support the defendant's claim. The court reasoned that the Orange County Council
was too large an association to have intimate associational rights. Further, the court
failed to see how the intimate and associational rights of den leaders and Cub
Scouts would be handicapped if members, who refuse to fulfill a duty to God, are
not permitted. In response to the ruling, the defendants appealed; however, the
court of appeal affirmed the trial court in all respects, but reversed the enjoinment
of the pack's and den's actions because these were not defendants to the action.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court of California granted the defendant's petition for
review.
Holding. The Supreme Court of California concisely reversed the judgement of
the court of appeal, but affirmed the reversal of the enjoinment of the pack's and
den's actions. The court ruled that the Unruh Civil Rights Act is inapplicable to
the defendant's membership decisions because the organization is not operating as
a business establishment. The court pointed out that the evidence indicated that the
organization is a charitable organization rather than a business establishment. First
of all, the court emphasized that the organization has a predominately expressive
social purpose that is not related to the economic interests of its members.
Secondly, the court noted that the organization offers members a program not
equivalent to a traditional place of public amusement or accommodation. Finally,
the court demonstrated that the organization does not sell the right to participate in
activities it offers to members. Because of the foregoing factors, the court
concluded that the defendants were not operating as a business establishment.
The court determined that because it held the Unruh Act inapplicable to the
defendants, the question of the constitutionality of the application of the Act need
not be considered.
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8 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 750 (9th ed.
Supp. 1997) (indicating Mothers Against Drunk Driving is a "business establish-
ment" under the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
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Exclude Atheist-Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 1333 (1994)
(pointing out that the Welsh court took note of California's Unruh Civil Rights
Act).
Sally Frank, The Key to Unlocking the Clubhouse Door: The Application of
Antidiscrimination Laws to Quasi-Private Clubs, 2 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 27
(1994) (noting that in recent years discrimination has been attacked in many
forums, including disputes over the Boy Scouts as a "business establishment").
Julie Gannon Shoop, Boys Scouts May Exclude Gays and Atheists, California
Court Holds, 34-JUN TRIAL 19 (1998) (noting that because the Boy Scouts are not
a "business establishment" and, thus, not under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, they
can exclude not only atheists, but men who acknowledge they are gay as well).
John E. Theuman, Exclusion or Expulsion from Association or Club as Violation
of State Civil Rights Act, 38 A.L.R.4th 628 (1981) (providing a detailed case
history and references for determining what constitutes a "business establishment"
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
Shannon Wead, Statutory Interpretation: Boy Scouts in the Bible Belt; Boy Scouts'
Rejection of Atheist Not Illegal in Kansas, Seaborn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy
Scouts of America, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 359 (1996) (noting that the Seaborn court
took note of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act and the "business establishment"
prerequisite).
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B. The Boy Scouts of America is not a "business organization of every kind
whatsoever" within the definition of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civil Code,
section 51); recovery is thus precluded under the Act for an individual who was
denied an assistant scoutmaster position because of his declared homosexuality.
Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., Supreme Court of
California, Decided March 23, 1998, 17 Cal. 4th 670, 952 P.2d 218, 72 Cal. Rptr.
2d 410.
Facts. The plaintiff, Timothy Curran, a former member of a Boy Scout troop, filed
an application to become an assistant scoutmaster in order to attend the 1981 Boy
Scouts of America National Jamboree. The defendant had become aware of the
plaintiff's declared homosexuality when the plaintiff had participated in a three-
part article that ran in the Oakland Tribune on the lives of gay teenagers. On the
basis of the plaintiff s avowed homosexuality, the defendant denied his application
to become an assistant scoutmaster, stating that his lifestyle ran contrary to the
morals of the Boy Scouts. The plaintiff, in response, filed an action pursuant to the
Unruh Civil Rights Act.
California Civil Code section 51 (the Unruh Civil Rights Act) requires
free and equal treatment to individuals without reference to sex, race, religion,
ancestry, national origin, or disability in access to the facilities and service of all
business establishments of every kind. The trial court initially bifurcated the case
into two issues. First, the trial court addressed whether or not the Boy Scouts fell
within the definition of a business organization under the Unruh Civil Rights Act,
and secondly, it considered whether or not judicially placing the plaintiff into the
defendant's organization violated the Boy Scouts' constitutional right of
association. As to the first issue, the trial court decided that the defendant did fall
under the auspices of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, basing its decision on the Boy
Scouts' prominence in the community and public service. Having established
liability under section 51, the court addressed the second phase of the trial. The
court determined that an order prohibiting the defendant from denying the
plaintiffs application would not violate the defendant's right to intimate
association. The trial court, however, did conclude that the defendant's right to
expressive application would be violated because the plaintiff's homosexuality
collided with the Boy Scouts' belief system, explicit in the Boy Scout Oath and
Law.
Both parties appealed from their respective judgements. The plaintiff
argued that there was no violation of the defendant's right of association, while the
defendant argued that it was not a business establishment under the gambit of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision as
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to the violation of the defendants' constitutional rights to expressive association.
The court of appeal, however, reversed both decisions in favor of the plaintiff,
finding a violation of the right to intimate association and also concluding that the
Boy Scout organization did not fall into the business establishment definition of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act.
Holding. The California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's decision,
agreeing as to the first issue that the Boy Scouts of America is not a business
establishment within the meaning of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Consequently,
the court determined that this preempted the defendant's affirmative defense of a
violation of constitutional right of access.
The court initially dismissed the plaintiff's argument that the defendant's
organization is definitively established as a business organization under the Unruh
Civil Rights Act by the law of the case doctrine. Analyzing previous decisions
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the court concluded that the issue as to whether
the Boy Scouts were a "business establishment" within the Act had not been
determined by those prior holdings. Although section 51 does not expressly define
what will be considered a "business establishment," the court has stated that the
term will be interpreted in "the broadest sense possible." The court thus
recognized that it is still bound by the underlying principles defined in the previous
cases, the legislative history, and the Act itself.
Beginning with the express language of Civil Code section 51, the court
recognized that it has applied the Act to many entities, including for profit and
nonprofit businesses. However, the court also concluded that no prior decision has
interpreted the term "business establishment" to apply to "charitable, expressive,
[or] social organization[s]" such as the Boy Scouts. The court concluded that the
Boy Scouts organization did not perform such functions that would further the
economic interests of its members. The court further concluded that because the
Boy Scouts met in small groups and participated in a variety of rituals, they were
not a place of public accommodation.
The Boy Scouts, in addition to their regular activities, conducted regular retail
business with nonmembers. The plaintiff construed these activities as pulling the
organization under the "business establishment" clause of section 51. The court,
though, viewed these activities of the organization as separate from the core
functions of the Boy Scouts. Specifically, the court stated that nonmembers could
not purchase rights to partake of the daily activities or even the educational and
recreational activities of the troop. The court sustained the plaintiff's argument to
the extent that the Unruh Civil Rights Act would apply only to those activities that
concern retail sales to nonmembers, and hence would fall outside the plaintiff's
contention.
As a final note, the court raised the general concern discussed at the trial level
that exclusion of the Boy Scouts from the Unruh Civil Rights Act would sanction
them to blanket immunity with which they could discriminate on any basis they
prefer. The court, however, dismissed this concern with alternative remedies, such
700
[Vol. 26: 683, 1999] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
as denial of tax-exempt status that is afforded nonprofit entities. Additionally, the
court invoked the statutory language of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, refusing to
extend it to a situation where it simply did not apply.
The court thus ruled for the Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of
America, refusing to extend the "business establishment" clause of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act to their organization. The resolution of the first issue in the defendant's
favor rendered the defendant's affirmative defense of a constitutional violation of
right to association a moot point.
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(discussing generally the historical development of the term "business establish-
ments").
Sharon Swain, Note, Forcing Open the Doors of Private Clubs: Warfield v.
Peninsula Golf & Country Club-Did the Court Go Too Far?, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
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Steven Wyllie, Comment, The Unruh Civil Rights Act: A Weapon to Combat
Homophobia in Military On-Campus Recruiting, 24 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1333
(1991) (advocating that allowing military institutions to recruit on campus violates
the Unruh Civil Rights Act because these organizations specifically bar homosexu-
als from their services).
MORGAN STEWART
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III. CONSUMER PROTECTION
The cost-shifting provision of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, which
allows plaintiffs to recover their costs, does not preclude recovery of costs by
prevailing defendants as provided for under California Code of Civil Procedure
sections 998 and 1032(b).
Murillo v. Fleetwood Enter., Inc., Supreme Court of California, Decided April 27,
1998, 17 Cal. 4th 985, 953 P.2d 858, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682.
Facts. In 1991, plaintiff Roberto Murillo bought a Fleetwood Pace Arrow motor
home from an authorized retail dealer. The motor home was covered by an express
warranty against defects by defendants Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., Fleetwood
Motor Homes of California, Inc., and Oshkosh Truck Corporation (collectively
sellers). Later that same year, Murillo believed the vehicle to have defects and
brought it in for repairs. Murillo remained dissatisfied with the repairs and filed
suit in March 1993. The complaint alleged that the sellers had breached express
and implied warranties and statutory provisions of the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act, more commonly known as the "lemon law."
Sellers offered to settle the case for $12,000, as well as allowing Murillo to
keep the vehicle. Murillo refused the offer of settlement and proceeded to trial.
The jury found in favor of the sellers on all counts. Subsequently, sellers filed a
memorandum of costs. Murillo made a motion to strike the memorandum of costs
or, in the alternative, to tax costs. The trial court denied the motion to strike,
finding that the Song-Beverly Act did not bar sellers' statutory right to recover
costs under Code of Civil Procedure sections 998 or 1032. Additionally, the trial
court denied the alternative motions to tax in their entirety. The court of appeal
affirmed the trial court's decision. The California Supreme Court granted review
to consider whether the provisions of the Song-Beverly Act, granting plaintiffs the
right to recover costs, provide an express exception to the statutory right of the
prevailing party to recover costs under sections 998 and 1032(b).
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that the Song-Beverly Act's statutory scheme for providing costs to
buyers does not abridge a prevailing defendant's general statutory right to recover
costs.
California Civil Code section 1032(b) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise
expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to
recover costs in any action or proceeding." The court found no preemption of this
right when a plaintiff sues under the Song-Beverly Act merely because no statutory
scheme is expressed for recovery of costs by prevailing defendants. The court
rejected the losing buyer's argument that the rule of statutory construction that the
inclusion of ene is the exclusion of the other applied in this case. This rule of
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construction does not trump the plain meaning of the statutory language. Where
the legislature has used the language "except as otherwise expressly provided by
statute," an express provision must exist to contravene this intent.
Although the court supported the idea that the cost-shifting provision of the
Song-Beverly Act is more specific than the general cost-recovery statute, and that
when inconsistent, a more specific statute controls over a more general one, the
court held that the two statutes are not inconsistent because they may be reconciled.
If a buyer prevails under the Song-Beverly Act, she is entitled to costs, expenses,
and attorney's fees. Should a seller prevail in an action brought under the Song-
Beverly Act, it is entitled to costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b).
The court also held that the defendants were entitled to expert witness fees per
Code of Civil Procedure section 998 because the plaintiff recovered less than the
sellers offered for settlement. Section 998 provides for augmentation of costs
under section 1032 where a plaintiff fails to obtain ajudgment more favorable than
the amount offered by the defendant to settle. The court concluded that the same
rationale as applied to section 1032(b) controlled this issue because of the inclusion
of the same language. "Because the cost-shifting provisions of the Song-Beverly
Act do not 'expressly' disable a prevailing defendant from recovering section 998
costs and fees in general, or expert witness fees in particular," the trial court's
award was proper.
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MICHELLE PIROZZI
IV. CORPORATIONS
"Stock Purchase Agreements," commonly referred to as "buy-sell agreements,"
which are silent as to the shareholder rights during the postemployment period
that is necessary to determine the value of shares, do not imply on their faces an
intention by the parties to deny the minority shareholders those rights during
postemployment.
Stephenson v. Drever, Supreme Court of California, Decided December 15, 1997,
16 Cal. 4th 1167, 947 P.2d 1301, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 764 (1997).
Facts. The plaintiff, Allen W. Stephenson, began his employment with Drever
Partners, Inc., a closely-held corporation, in 1980. On December 15, 1990, the
plaintiff and Maxwell Bruce Drever, the majority stockholder of Drever Partners,
entered into a contract entitled "Stock Purchase Agreement." The contract recited
that in recognition of the value of the plaintiff's services and as an incentive for
him to remain in its employ, Drever Partners agreed to sell the plaintiff 500 shares
of its common stock. The agreement provided, "in the event of the termination of
Stephenson's employment for any reason whatsoever, including his retirement or
death, then, on or before ninety (90) days after the date of such termination, Drever
Partners shall have the right and obligation to repurchase all of the shares" that it
agreed to sell to Stephenson. This type of agreement is commonly known as a
"buy-sell agreement." The Stock Purchase Agreement further provided that after
September 15, 1991, the repurchase price of the shares would be "the fair market
value thereof." If the parties could not agree on the fair market value, it would be
fixed by an independent appraiser. Drever Partners sold the 500 shares to the
plaintiff pursuant to the contract, which amounted to eleven percent of the
outstanding common stock of the corporation. Maxwell Drever owned the
remaining 89 percent. On May 16, 1994, Drever and the plaintiff entered into
another agreement providing that the plaintiff's employment by Drever Partners
would terminate0as of July 1, 1994. The agreement provided that the plaintiff's
shares would be valued as of May 1, 1994. The parties were unable to agree on the
fair market value of the shares, and a dispute over the appraisal process ensued.
Because of that dispute, the fair market value of the plaintiff's shares had not yet
been determined and Drever Partners has not repurchased those shares. The
plaintiff remained their record owner. On May 8, 1995, the plaintiff filed the
present action against Drever and two other persons in their capacities as officers
and directors of Drever Partners. The complaint charged that Drever breached the
fiduciary duty that he owed as a director and as controlling shareholder to treat the
plaintiff, as the minority shareholder, fairly, in good faith, and in a manner that
benefits all shareholders proportionately.
The defendants demurred on two principal grounds. First, they contended
that they owed no fiduciary duty to the plaintiff at any time alleged in the complaint
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because the plaintiff's status as a shareholder assertedly terminated as of May 1,
1994, the valuation date of the shares he had agreed to resell to Drever Partners
upon leaving its employ. Second, the defendants contended the action was
derivative in nature and the plaintiff lacked standing to sue derivatively because his
shareholder's status had terminated.
The trial court sustained the demurrer on the first ground without leave to
amend. The court ruled as a matter of law that on the face of the contract, the
defendants' fiduciary duty to the plaintiff by reason of his status as a shareholder
ceased as of May 1, 1994, and after that date the plaintiff's rights were contractual
only and his relationship to Drever Partners was as a creditor, not as a shareholder.
The trial court also noted that it found the defendant's derivative action persuasive.
The court of appeal and the California Supreme Court construed this as a formal
ruling sustaining the demurrer on the defendant's second ground as well. The trial
court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court of appeal affirmed the
judgment of dismissal on the first ground of the demurrer, and for that reason
declared it unnecessary to reach the second ground.
Holding. Reversing the judgment of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held the Stock Purchase Agreement, which was silent as to shareholder rights
during the postemployment period necessary to determine the value of his shares,
did not imply on its face an intention by the parties to deny the minority share-
holder those rights during that period.
The Stock Purchase Agreement entered into was an executory contract to buy
and sell personal property-specifically, shares of corporate stock owned by an
employee-if and when a particular event occurs, i.e., the termination of employ-
ment. The California Supreme Court relied upon the general rule in Gilfallan v.
Gilfallan, 168 Cal. 23, 141 P. 623 (1914), which stated, "[u]pon a executory
agreement to buy and sell personal property, title does not pass to the buyer until
delivery is made to him or is due to him and is offered to be made, unless there is
something in the contract specifying or implying a different intention." Due to the
fact that the plaintiff had not delivered his shares to Drever Partners because their
fair market value had not been determined and delivered to him, legal title to the
plaintiffs shares had not passed to Drever Partners. The plaintiff remained a
shareholder of record of the corporation with all rights appurtenant to that status.
The court noted that the contract did not expressly provide that when
Stephenson's employment terminated, he immediately lost his status as a
shareholder and was entitled to the value of his shares but was no longer entitled
to participation in the corporation. However, the court recognized that the contract
plainly contemplated some delay in consummating the repurchase of the plaintiff's
shares after the termination of his employment. For example, the provision
providing that the repurchase may take place at any time "on or before ninety (90)
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days after the date" of the plaintiff's termination, and the provision providing for
an appraiser to make a determination of the fair market value of the stock if the
parties cannot agree. The court explained that these provisions negated any
inference that the repurchase of the shares be consummated-that the plaintiff's
status as a shareholder be terminated-immediately upon termination as an
employee.
The court further explained that recognition of the implied termination
provision urged by the defendants would affect the plaintiff's rights as a
shareholder under California law. After discussing the wide range of statutory
rights a shareholder has to participate in corporate affairs, the court expressed
concern that interpreting the Stock Purchase Agreement to deny the plaintiff his
rights as a shareholder immediately when his employment terminated would have
the effect of stripping the plaintiff of all the statutory shareholder's rights, even
though he remained legal owner of record; representing eleven percent of Drever
Partners' equity.
Therefore, the California Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred
in sustaining the demurrer on the first ground and the judgment of the court of
appeal upholding that ruling should be reversed. In the court of appeal, the
plaintiff also challenged the second ground on which the trial court sustained the
demurrer, that the action was derivative in nature. Because the court of appeal did
not resolve that contention, the court remanded the case for it to do so.
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Go , 23 WAKE FORESTL. REV. 163 (1988) (suggesting that directors' duties extend
beyond the traditionally united realm of shareholder protection).
James Van Vliet Jr. & Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for
Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
239 (1998) (describing the circumstances in which shareholders in closely held
corporations have been held to owe a partner a fiduciary duty).
D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Form, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998)
(arguing that directors do not always act in the best interests of the shareholders).
Park Meginly, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need For Shareholders
Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163 (1997)
(explaining why courts almost always apply the duty of loyalty towards sharehold-
ers inconsistently).
NICHOLLE PETRIKAS
712
[Vol. 26: 683, 1999] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
V. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Where a person is convicted of any combination of at least three misde-
meanor violations that fall under the penumbra of California Vehicle Code
section 23175, any similar future convictions that occur within seven years of
the three prior convictions will be subject to an enhanced penalty in accordance
with section 23175, regardless of the order in which the offenses were actually
committed. Additionally, increasing the penalty for a fourth violation from a
misdemeanor to a felony does not violate ex post facto laws, regardless of the
fact that the fourth infraction occurred before the prior three triggering
violations, so long as the offense increasing the penalty occurred after the
effective date of section 23175 as amended in 1984.
People v. Snook, Supreme Court of California, Decided December18, 1997, 16 Cal.
4th 1210, 947 P.2d 808, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615.
Facts. A recidivist statute, California Vehicle Code section 23175 heightens what
would normally be a misdemeanor conviction to a felony after the fourth violation
following any combination of three or more prior separate violations that result in
convictions. The violations listed under the statute include DUI (prohibited by
section 23152(a)), and driving with a blood alcohol level at or above .08 percent
(prohibited by section 23152(b)). Any convictions following the prior three
convictions, however, must have occurred within seven years of the three triggering
convictions in order to fall under the purview of section 23175. Section 23175 was
enacted in 1983, but was amended in 1984, replacing the words "prior offenses"
for the words "separate offenses," effective in 1985.
Guy Edward Snook, the defendant, was arrested on April 6, 1992 for DUI.
He was charged with three misdemeanors, one for DUI under section 23152(a), one
for driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent under section 23152(b), and
one for driving with a suspended license under section 14601.1. At his court
appearance, however, the court had no record of his violations and thus resched-
uled trial for a later date. Meanwhile, Snook was again arrested for DUI on three
separate occasions: June 11, 1992, September 23, 1993, and October 25, 1993.
He was convicted of all three latter violations on October 2, 1992, January 25,
1994, and February 25, 1994, respectively. On April 27, 1994, an amendment was
made to the complaint charging the three original violations stemming from April
1992, such that count number one and number two for the DUI violations were
charged by the prosecutor to be felonies instead of misdemeanors under section
23175. The court found the defendant guilty as charged of the original April 1992
violations, and thus sentenced him for one misdemeanor and two felonies in
accordance with section 23175.
The defendant appealed, claiming that his right to a speedy trial had been
denied because he had to wait twenty-two months to be tried for the original
violations, and also claimed that the heightened sentence of two of his original
violations from the status of a misdemeanor to a felony violated ex post facto laws.
Rejecting the defendant's claim of a failure to be given a speedy trial, the court of
appeal held section 23175 as violative of ex post facto laws because a law cannot
allow for later violations of law to increase the penalty for previous violations.
Also, the court of appeal refused to apply section 23175 to the defendant because
the purpose of this statute is to deter recidivism, and in the court's view, a person
will not be deterred from committing earlier crimes by enhancing the penalty for
that conduct at a later time. The California Supreme Court granted review to
consider whether section 23175, as applied to the case at hand, does in fact further
the ends of a proper recidivist statute, and also to consider whether section 23175
violates ex post facto laws of the state of California or of the Constitution of the
Unites States.
Holding. The Supreme Court of California reversed the court of appeal, holding
that section 23175 will likely prohibit a person who has DUI charges pending from
committing any further such violations out of a fear that any future infringements
may subject him or her to a felony sentence for future violations, regardless of the
chronology of the offenses. Also, the court reversed the lower court, holding that
section 23175 does not violate ex post facto laws.
According to the court, its job in interpreting the statue is to determine the
legislative intent behind the law. To determine this intent, the court must first look
to the plain words of the statute, which are presumed to be the actual meaning of
the statute so long as the words are unambiguous. Stating section 23175(a) word
for word, the court noted that the 1984 amendment states that a person will be
subject to enhanced punishment under section 23175 for "separate violations" of
three or more DUI offenses within the last seven years. Because section 23175
uses the words "separate violations," there is no requirement that the triggering
violations occur before the offense sought to be enhanced. Furthermore, "separate
violations" means only that the triggering violations be different from the one
sought to be enhanced, not that the triggering offenses occur at chronologically
different times from different criminal acts by a defendant. Noting that the statute
states that a misdemeanor can be enhanced where the offense occurred within
seven years "of' three or more offenses, the court also stated that the legislature
was clear that the chronological order of offenses was not important in interpreting
the statute because the legislature could have used the word "after" rather than
"of.''
As enacted in 1983, section 23175 increased the punishment for a DUI to a
felony where the latter offense occurred "within five years of three or more prior
offenses." The legislature changed the text in 1984 by replacing the words "five
years" with "seven years," and "prior offenses" to "separate offenses." At the
same time the legislature reworded section 23175, it also reworded a similar statute
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in like fashion, section 23217 of the same code. According to the legislature, it
changed the text of section 23217 to read "separate offenses" in an effort to prevent
criminals from attempting to get around the intent of congress, which is to punish
the recidivist with increasingly greater punishment. The legislature further
explained that the timing of a crime should not be used as a loophole to get around
the effect of a recidivist statute, regardless of whether the offenses and convictions
for those offenses were committed simultaneously or not. Analogizing the
legislative intent behind changing section 23217 to 23175, the court inferred that
it was thus the legislative intent to similarly broaden the power of section 23175.
As such, the court stated that the combination of three things shows congressional
intent to punish a recidivist for his actions under section 23175, regardless of the
order of such offenses: 1) legislative substitution of the words "separate offenses"
for "prior offenses," 2) the reasoning for doing so by the legislature in relation to
section 23217, and 3) the purpose of assembly bill number 3833, passed in 1984,
which was to close the timing loophole being used by recidivists.
The court also attacked what it perceived as the faulty rationale of the
appellate court in stating that section 23175 does nothing to prohibit recidivism,
which rationale presumes that a person will only be dissuaded from committing
multiple DUI offenses where he is under a threat of increasingly harsher penalties.
The California Supreme Court stated that where a person with pending DUI
charges has awareness that future violations may expose him to felony punishment,
he may well refrain from any future violations in order to avoid such increased
punishment. Also, the rationale of the court of appeals was faulty because it
perpetuates the loophole that the legislature intended to destroy.
Stating that California's prohibition against ex post facto laws is to be
interpreted exactly like the prohibition in the federal constitution, the court noted
a case before the United States Supreme Court that stated.that the prohibition
against ex post facto laws is intended to prohibit three categories of legislative acts"
those which 1) punish an act as a crime that was innocent when performed, 2)
increase the burden of a punishment after it has already been committed, and 3)
deprive a person charged with a crime of a defense he was entitled to at the time
of the supposed criminal act. The defendant argued that section 23175 violates the
second category because he had only committed misdemeanors on April 6, 1992,
but that the penalties were enhanced by section 23175 to felonies by the time he
was convicted. Rejecting this argument, the California Supreme Court stated that
the law had not changed between the time he had committed the acts and was
convicted. Instead, the defendant's own conduct caused the enhancement. This
self-inflicted change is insufficient to prove an ex post facto violation. The
purpose of the prohibition against ex post facto laws is to stop the government from
giving a lack of fair notice when increasing punishments beyond that originally
contemplated when a law was enacted. There was no violation in the present case
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because the defendant was on fair notice that repeatedly violating DUI laws would
subject him to felony punishments in accordance with the requirements of section
23175.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall.., pass any... ex post facto Law
CAL. CONST. art I, § 9 ("A[n] ... ex post facto law... may not be passed .....
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23175(a) (West 1988) (enhancing a misdemeanor conviction to
a felony where a person has violated certain statutes more than three times within
the last seven years).
CAL. VEH. CODE. § 23152(a) (West 1988) ("It is unlawful for any person who is
under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined
influence of any alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle.").
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152(b) (West 1988) ("It is unlawful for any person who has
0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.").
CAL. VEH. CODE § 14601.2(a) (West Supp. 1992) ("No person shall drive a motor
vehicle at any time when that person's driving privilege is suspended or revoked
for a conviction of a violation of section 23152 or 23153, if the person so driving
has knowledge of the suspension or revocation.").
.Case Law:
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (defining the three types of ex post
facto situations that the Constitution was intended to prevent).
People v. Albitre, 184 Cal. App. 3d 895, 229 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1986) (opining that
a sentence can be enhanced regardless of the order in which DUI offenses took
place).
People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 711 P.2d 480, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985)
(following other habitual offender statutes that a criminal who is undeterred by
prior experience with the criminal justice system should suffer increased
punishment).
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People v. Pieters, 52 Cal. 3d 894,802 P.2d 420,276 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1991) (stating
that California's Constitution should be interpreted similarly to the Federal
Constitution).
People v. Wells, 12 Cal. 4th 979, 911 P.2d 1374, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (1996)
(stating that the legislative use of similar terms in a related statute shows legislative
intent that the two statutes are to receive the same interpretation).
Legal Texts:
17 CAL. JuR. 3d Criminal Law § 9 (1984 & Supp. 1998) (discussing ex post facto
laws generally).
22 CAL. JuR. 3d Criminal Law §§ 3362-3391 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the
enhancement of punishment for crimes generally).
1 B.E. WrKN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Introduction
to Crimes §§ 16-20 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1998) (outlining general principles of ex
post facto laws).
2 B.E. W1TKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Three orMore
Separate Convictions § 926 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the application
of section 23175).
2 B.E. WITKN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Driving While
License Suspended or Revoked § 935 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1998) (generally
discussing the law against driving with a suspended or revoked license).
3 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Enhancements
§ 1384 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the legality of enhancing a criminal
sentence).
3 B.E. WmTKN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Prior Prison
Term Enhancement § 1511 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1998) (showing that repeat
offenders of certain crimes are subject to a one year prison enhancement where a
criminal served prior time in jail).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
David M. Brown, Review of Selected 1993 California Legislation - Transportation
and Motor Vehicles: Habitual Traffic Offenders, 25 PAC. L.J. 836 (1993)
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(outlining California Vehicle Code section 23190, a recidivist statute similar to
23175).
Loren L. Barr, The "Three Strikes" Dilemma: Crime Reduction at Any Price?, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 107 (looking at the cost-benefit of a recidivist statute).
Mark W. Owens, California's Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times Require
Desperate Measures-But Will it Work?, 26 PAC. L.J. 881 (1995) (looking at the
danger of imposing harsh recidivist statutes).
Markus Dirk Dubber, The Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat Offenders: A
Critique of California's Habitual Criminal Statute, 43 STAN. L. REv. 193 (1990)
(discussing, among other things, the policy reasons against the current trend
towards increased, broad recidivist statutes).
Marty Jaquez, "Strike Three, Yer Out! ": Examining the Constitutional Limits on
the Use of Prior Uncounseled DWI Convictions to Impose Mandatory Prison
Sentences on RepeatDWI Offenders, 28 SAN DIEOL. REV. 685 (1991) (analyzing
the effects and boundaries of laws which allow for the enhanced punishment of
DUI recidivists).
PAUL NEIL
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B. The United States Supreme Court determined in Harris that evidence
obtained by a police officer who knowingly violates a defendant's Miranda
rights may still be used against the defendant at trial for impeachment purposes.
The Harris rule applies regardless of whether the police officer intentionally
violates the defendant's Miranda protections.
People v. Peevy, Supreme Court of California, Decided May 7, 1998, 17 Cal. 4th
1184, 953 P.2d 1212, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865.
Facts. On January 30, 1995, Airreque Peevy was arrested by San Bernardino
County Deputy Sheriff Douglas Combs for attempted theft. After Deputy Combs
advised him of his Miranda rights, Peevy stated that he wished to remain silent.
Peevy was then taken to the office of Detective Dennis Henderson who again
advised him of his rights pursuant to Miranda. At that time, Peevy requested an
attorney. Detective Henderson continued to question Peevy even though he had
invoked his Miranda rights. After ten minutes of questioning, during which
Detective Henderson spoke in a conversational tone, did not threaten or make
promises to Peevy, and remained three feet away from him at all times, Peevy
admitted that he went to the Kentucky Fried Chicken in Hesperia with the intent to
steal money from the manager, Jack McBrayer. Later, while he was being
transferred to the county jail, Peevy began to make more incriminating statements
to Deputy Combs, who then advised him of his Miranda rights for a third time.
Peevy stated that he knew his rights and wished to talk. He then implicated Joshua
Jenkins, his accomplice, claiming that he was only helping Jenkins, a disgruntled
KFC employee.
In a motion in limine to exclude evidence of any statements by the defendant,
Detective Henderson stated that he knew that he was violating Miranda, but that
he continued to question Peevy because he knew that any information obtained in
violation of Miranda would be admissable for impeachment purposes. Deputy
Combs was present during the interview. The trial court found that the police had
interviewed the defendant in deliberate violation of his Miranda rights. The
prosecution was barred frorfi using the information in its case-in-chief, but was
allowed to use it for impeachment purposes. The trial court further found that the
defendant's statements to Deputy Combs were inadmissable for any purpose
because that interrogation was "abusive," as it came after a third Miranda
advisement.
At trial, Peevy testified that there was no plan to rob McBrayer. Instead, he
claimed to be an unwilling accomplice who took no part in the actual attempted
robbery. In rebuttal, Detective Henderson testified that Peevy had admitted being
there with the intent to rob McBrayer. In surrebuttal, Peevy denied making any
statements to the police. The jury ultimately found Peevy guilty of second degree
attempted robbery and he was sentenced to two years in state prison.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing
Detective Henderson to testify as to statements made by the defendant in violation
of Miranda. The court of appeal upheld the conviction, noting that the United
States Supreme Court had determined that statements taken in violation of Miranda
are admissable for impeachment purposes. The California Supreme Court granted
review to determine whether the Harris rule applies when a police officer
intentionally disregards a defendant's invocation of his Miranda protections in
order to obtain evidence for impeachment purposes.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that a defendant's post-Mirandized statements are admissable for
impeachment purposes regardless of the police officer's intent to violate the
defendant's Miranda rights.
In order to protect a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights against self-
incrimination, the United States Supreme Court instituted the Miranda protections.
These protections require the police to inform a suspect, prior to custodial
interrogation, of his rights to remain silent and have counsel available during
questioning. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the United States
Supreme Court determined that statements taken in violation of Miranda are
admissible for impeachment purposes as long as the statements are otherwise
voluntary. The Court reasoned that Miranda was intended to prevent involuntary
confessions, but that it does not follow that a defendant should be allowed to
perjure himself if those Miranda rights are violated. In later decisions, the Court
noted that the Harris rule struck a balance between the need to deter police
misconduct and the need to expose perjury. In Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975), the Court specifically addressed a situation in which the officers might
deliberately ignore a suspect's Miranda rights in order to gain evidence solely for
impeachment purposes. The Court specifically noted that, in such a case, actions
amounting to "abuse" would make the statements involuntary and thus
inadmissable even for impeachment purposes. Finally, in Michigan v. Harvey, 494
U.S. 344 (1990), the Court stated that, in situations where the police ignore a
suspect's Miranda rights, the "search for truth" outweighs the "speculative
possibility" that exclusion of evidence might deter police misconduct.
In the present case, the defendant argued that his statements should have been
excluded, even for impeachment purposes, because the detective intentionally
violated his Miranda rights. The defendant argued that the Harris rule is only
meant to apply in cases of unknowing violations of Miranda rights. The California
Supreme Court found, however, that Harris did not clearly address this issue.
Instead, the court found that the intention behind excluding evidence obtained in
violation of Miranda is to deter police misconduct. This deterrence is achieved by
excluding this evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief. The court concluded
that a defendant has no right to then perjure himself on the stand in light of prior
inconsistent statements, regardless of the intent of the officer in obtaining those
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statements. The supreme court based its conclusion on the decisions in Hass and
Harvey, which seemed to include statements made in deliberate violation of
Miranda. The court further reasoned that the officer's subjective state of mind is
irrelevant to a determination of a Miranda violation. Instead, it is the defendant's
state of mind that matters and whether the statements made were voluntary.
The supreme court rejected the defendant's argument that Butts is controlling
on this issue. In California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 922 F. Supp.
327 (C.D. Cal. 1996), the federal district court held that a suspect's statements may
be inadmissable if the police officers knowingly violate his Miranda rights in order
to gain impeachment evidence. The court argued that Butts is inapposite because
the state trial court held that the defendant's statements were inadmissable because
they were involuntary. The court also rejected the State's argument that Miranda
protections are merely evidentiary concerns. It re-iterated that Miranda rights are
designed to prevent police misconduct and that the Harris rule is designed to
balance the need to deter police misconduct against the need to expose a
defendant's perjury.
Finally, the supreme court refused to consider the defendant's argument that
the Harris rule has resulted in widespread police misconduct designed to gain
evidence for impeachment purposes. The defendant failed to raise this issue at
trial, and was therefore barred from raising it on appeal.
The California Supreme Court held that because Article I, section 28 of the
California Constitution provides that statements taken in violation of Miranda are
only to be excluded to the extent required under the federal constitution, the Harris
rule is applicable regardless of the intent of the police officer in violating a
defendant's Miranda rights. As long as the statements are otherwise voluntary,
they are admissable for impeachment purposes.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .... ").
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28, subd. (d) (establishing that statements taken in violation
of Miranda are to be excluded from evidence only to the extent required by the
federal constitution).
Case Law:
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that when a suspect is in
custody, police must inform him of his right to remain silent and have an attorney
present during questioning and cease questioning if the rights are invoked).
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (providing that a statement taken in
violation of Miranda is admissable for impeachment purposes as long as the
statement is otherwise voluntary).
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (stating that Harris struck a balance between
the need to deter police misconduct and the need to expose defendants who perjure
themselves at trial).
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990) (stating that the "search for truth"
outweighs the "speculative possibility" that excluding statements for impeachment
purposes would deter police misconduct).
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 922 F. Supp. 327 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (suggesting that the applicability of the Harris rule might depend upon
whether the police acted purposefully in violating Miranda rights).
Legal Texts:
9 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal §§'789-790 (3d ed. 1985) (stating
that an appellate court is generally not the forum for establishing additional facts).
5 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Trial § 2886
(2d ed. 1989) (generally discussing the admissability of evidence at trial).
19 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 2189 (1984 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the general
rule that coerced confessions are inadmissable).
19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2182-2188 (1984 & Supp. 1997) (generally
discussing the privilege against self-incrimination that is guaranteed by both the
federal and state constitutions).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Kelly McMurry, California Supreme Court Chips Away at Miranda, 34-AUG
TRIAL 81 (1998) (cautioning that, in light of Peevy, criminal defendants' Miranda
protections may become nothing more than a meaningless ritual).
Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo
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Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261 (1998) (arguing that the exclusionary rule's
value is not as a deterrent to police misconduct, but operates instead to place both
parties, the state and the accused, in the position they would have been had the
Constitution not been violated).
Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1055 (1998) (examining the effects of Miranda on police effectiveness in
combating crime and connecting it with the limitations on police questioning as a
direct result of Miranda).
PAUL VALCORE
C. Where a court has stayed a sentence on an otherwise qualifying prior
conviction under California Penal Code section 654 because imposing the
sentence would constitute multiple punishment, it is within the discretion of a
trial court to later treat the stayed conviction as a strike.
People v. Benson, Supreme Court of California, Decided May 14, 1998, 18 Cal. 4th
24, 954 P.2d 557, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294.
Facts. California Penal Code section 667(b)-(i) is commonly known as a Three
Strikes Law. Under the statute, a defendant with prior qualifying convictions can
receive a longer sentence than a first-time offender when he receives second or
third qualifying convictions. On November 30, 1994, the defendant was arrested
for stealing a twenty dollar carton of cigarettes from a department store. At trial,
a jury convicted him of petty theft with a prior conviction. He was found to have
two other strikes and was subsequently sentenced to twenty-five years to life in
prison. The defendant's two prior convictions arose out of a single transaction in
1979. The defendant broke into a residence and stabbed its occupant over twenty
times. He was subsequently convicted of both residential burglary and assault with
the intent to commit murder. Both of the felonies qualify as prior felony
convictions under the Three Strikes Law. Following the convictions, the trial court
stayed the sentence on the assault conviction to avoid multiple punishment.
California Penal Code section 654 prohibits separate punishments for offenses
arising out of the same incident: in this case, the assault with intent to commit
murder was the underlying felony for the burglary conviction. While the trial court
did not expressly refer to section 654 in its record, both parties assumed the stay
was pursuant to that section and the court of appeal found the assumption
reasonable. The supreme court granted review to consider whether the defendant's
two prior convictions can be considered separate strikes under the Three Strikes
Law where the convictions were imposed for offenses that were part of an
indivisible transaction committed against a single victim, and where one of the
sentences was stayed because imposition of separate punishments for those
offenses would constitute multiple punishments prohibited by section 654.
The defendant's claim was two-fold. First, he argued that the Three Strikes
Law was not intended to make a two-strike offender out of offenses committed in
an indivisible transaction unless the legislature specifically stated otherwise.
Second, the defendant contended that the language of the Three Strikes Law is not
sufficiently clear. He argued that because the statute does not specifically
enumerate a stay of sentence compelled under section 654, those stays must be
excluded as prior convictions under the Three Strikes Law. The court of appeal
affirmed the trial court's conviction on the petty theft with a prior and remanded
it to the trial court on the issue of striking the prior offenses. The court of appeal
instructed the trial court that it was within its discretion to strike the prior
conviction.
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Holding. The California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's decision
and held that when a court has stayed sentence on an otherwise qualifying
conviction under section 654, that conviction may later be treated as a strike. The
court specifically found that the defendant had two strikes stemming from the 1979
incident. The court pointed to the legislative history, the legislative purpose, and
the plain meaning of the statute as the grounds for its conclusion. Rejecting the
defendant's contention that the Three Strikes Law was not intended to allow
multiple strikes to arise out of a single indivisible transaction, the court dissembled
his two-prong argument. First, the defendant relied on the supreme court's
holding, eight years prior to the enactment of the Three Strikes Law, in People v.
Pearson, 42 Cal. 3d 351, 721 P.2d 595, 228 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1986). The rule from
Pearson stated that where service of sentence on a conviction was stayed, the
conviction may, only be the basis for an enhanced sentence where the legislature
has specifically allowed it. The precise issue in this case, then, was whether the
legislature spoke clearly enough in the Three Strikes Law regarding stays of
sentence to overcome the rule from Pearson.
The defendant argued that a stay of sentence arises in many different contexts
outside those granted under section 654, and because section 667 did not specify
a particular kind of stay of sentence, it was ambiguous and did not overcome the
rule from Pearson. The court decisively rejected this argument and said that while
there were statutes that were ambiguous, there were few that were as clear as
section 667, and therefore its plain meaning governed. No stay of sentence,
regardless of qualification or exception, will affect the determination that a prior
conviction is a prior felony under the Three Strikes Law.
The court went on to say that even if there were reason to look beyond the
statute's plain meaning, the legislative history of the bill clearly showed that the
issue of multiple strikes arising out of a single transaction was considered by the
legislative committees, and that no requirement that the prior offenses be separate
was ever drafted into law. The court further reasoned that the primary focus of the
Three Strikes Law is the status of the defendant as a repeat felon after the initial
strike or strikes. Regardless of whether he had one or two strikes, the fact that he
was still committing crime was the basis for the sentence enhancements. The court
said that the defendant had notice after the two prior convictions, regardless of the
stayed sentence, that reoffending would bring stiff penalties. Allotting the
defendant two strikes rather than one is entirely in keeping with the purpose of the
three strikes law. The defendant's prior offenses were extremely violent crimes,
and society has a strong interest in punishing him more severely for his reciditivist
behavior.
In a footnote, the court specifically stated that it did not decide whether there
are circumstances where two prior felony convictions are so closely connected, i.e.
they arose out of a single act instead of multiple acts in a single transaction, that a
trial court would abuse its discretion by not striking one of the prior convictions.
REFERENCES:
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1998).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1998).
Case Law:
People v. Fuhrman, 16 Cal. 4th 930, 941 P.2d 1189, 67 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1997)
(holding that prior convictions do not have to be brought and tried separately to
qualify as strikes).
People v. Allison, 41 Cal. App. 4th 841, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756 (1995) (finding no
brought-and-tried separately requirement, and further finding the language of
section 667 clear and unambiguous).
People v. Pearson, 42 Cal. 3d 351, 721 P.2d 595, 228 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1986)
(finding that the defendant was not subject to future enhancements for two
convictions where the sentences were stayed to avoid multiple punishment, unless
the legislature specifically declared that such convictions could later be used to
penalize him).
People v. Niles, 227 Cal. App. 2d 749, 39 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1964) (setting forth the
stay-procedure emphasized by the dissent as being the standard for the last thirty
years).
Legal Texts:
17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 524 (1984 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing
multiple punishment).
18 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 1206 (1984 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing
sentence enhancements).
22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3381 (1984 & Supp. 1998) (discussing prior
convictions being used for sentence enhancement).
1 B.E. WTKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALiFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses § 271
(2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1998) (summarizing California statutes and constitutional
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provisions addressing former jeopardy).
3 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crimes §§ 1382-1387
(2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1998) (discussing invalid multiple punishments,
enhancements, included offenses, and single versus multiple prosecution).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Lisa E. Cowart, Comment, Legislative Prerogative vs. Judicial Discretion:
California's Three Strikes Law Takes a Hit, 47 DEPAuL L. REV. 615 (1998)
(discussing the purpose, application, and policy behind three strikes laws and why
rehabilitation is a better focus than retribution).
John Clark et al., "Three Strikes and You're Out": Are Repeat Offender Laws
Having Their Anticipated Effects?, 81 JUDICATURE 144 (1998) (surveying the
states' three strikes laws).
Criminal Procedure: Trial and Post-Trial Issues, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 1074 (1997)
(discussing developments in state constitutional law, particularly multiple
punishments and double jeopardy).
Ilene M. Shinbein, "Three Strikes and You're Out": A Good Political Slogan to
Reduce Crime, Buta Failure in its Application, 22 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. AND CIV.
CONFINEMENT 175 (1996) (discussing the current and future impact of three strikes
laws nationwide, and specifically in California).
Meredith McClain, Note, "Three Strikes and You're Out": The Solution to the
Repeat Offender Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97 (1996) (analyzing the
legislative history and constitutionality of federal three strikes legislation).
KIRSTEN SEEBART
D. A prior conviction does not have to be brought and tried separately from
another conviction in order to count as a separate strike under the three strikes
law. Additionally, a defendant must seek relief through a petition for writ of
habeas corpus when the record is silent as to whether the trial court understood
that it retained discretion under section 1385 to dismiss a prior felony
conviction.
People v. Fuhrman, Supreme Court of California, DecidedAugust 28, 1997, 16 Cal.
4th 930, 941 P.2d 1189, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1.
Facts. California Penal Code section 667(c)(6) and (7) provide in pertinent part
that:
[i]f there is a current conviction for more than one felony count not committed on
the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts, the court
shall sentence the defendant consecutively on each count pursuant to subdivision
(e). If there is a current conviction for more than one serious or violent felony...
the court shall impose the sentence for each conviction consecutive to the sentence
for any other conviction for which the defendant may be consecutively sentenced.
The trial court found that the defendant, Scott Robert Fuhrman, who was convicted
of robbery and assault in a prior proceeding, had two prior strikes under the three
strikes law even though the two convictions were from that single prior proceeding.
Subsequently, the defendant, who was convicted of robbery and unlawfully driving
or taking a vehicle in another proceeding, was convicted as a third strike defendant
under Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (c) and (e). The defendant attempted
to remand the case to the trial court under section 1385 in order for the court to use
its discretionary powers to strike one or more of the defendant's prior convictions.
The defendant acknowledged that his prior conviction for robbery and assault
with a deadly weapon was a serious or violent felony as required under the Three
Strikes law. However, the defendant argued that the prior felony conviction should
have been "brought and tried separately" in order to count as two strikes. In
support of his argument, the defendant reasoned that the meaning of "prior
conviction" under section 667, subdivision (d) of the Three Strikes law is
ambiguous. The defendant also noted that section 667(c)(6) and (7) provided that
the court cannot sentence the defendant consecutively on each count "[unless] there
is a current conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same
occasion, and not arising from the same operative facts." The defendant also
argued that section 667(a) imposes a five year enhancement for each prior violent
or serious felony conviction for charges "brought and tried separately." The
defendant also argued that even if two strikes were allowed in a single proceeding,
separate strikes cannot stand because the trial court in the prior proceeding
determined that separate punishment was precluded under section 654. The court
of appeal affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
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Holding. The California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's decision,
holding that the Three Strikes law does not require convictions to be "brought and
tried" separately to count as a separate strike. The court further held that the case
would not be remanded to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion in striking
either of the defendant's prior serious felonies. In respect to the first holding, the
court reasoned that section 667(a) is a seperate enhancement statue and not relevant
to the Three Strikes law. The court further reasoned that the drafters would have
included the "brought and tried" separately clause under the Three Strikes law if
that was their intent. The court noted that the drafters did not include this language
in section 667, subdivision (d). The court further noted that section 667,
subdivision (c)(6) and (7) has no bearing upon the meaning of "prior conviction."
Thus, the court concluded that the language which refers to "prior conviction" in
667, subdivision (d) is not vague or ambiguous. In respect to the 654 issue, the
court reasoned that this case is "not an appropriate vehicle for deciding the... 654
issue."
In respect to the second holding, the supreme court reasoned that in Romero,
the court left the door open to whether a case should be remanded to trial where the
record does not affirmatively disclose if the trial court misunderstood its
discretionary powers to strike convictions. Thus, the California Supreme Court
reasoned that because there was not an "[a]ffirmative indication in the record that
the trial court committed error or would have exercised discretion under section
1385, relief on appeal is not appropriate ..
REFERENCES
Statues and Legislative History:
California Penal Code § 667(a)-(i) (West 1998) (discussing the elements of the
three strikes law).
California Penal Code § 1385 (West 1998) (noting that court has discretion to
strike a defendant's prior conviction).
Case Law:
People v. Jones, 17 Cal. 4th 279, 949 P.2d 890, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793 (1998)
(discussing sentencing procedures).
Williams v. Cambra, 1997 WL 703779, *2 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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Legal Texts:
17 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 9 (1984 & Supp. 1997) (discussing ex post facto
laws in helping to understand Romero).
3 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Prior Serious
Felonies § 1515(c) (2d ed. Supp. 1998) (discussing the new statutory requirements
for a prior serious felony).
3 B.E. WrrKn & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, New
Application of Romero Rule § 1515(i) (2d ed. Supp. 1989) (discussing the Romero
rule).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Christine Markel, Note and Comment, A Swing and a Miss: California's Three
Strikes Law, WHITIER L. REV. (1996) (examining the history of the Three Strikes
law).
Grace Lidia Suarez, Striking a Prior Conviction in Three Strikes Cases, 16 Nov
CAL. LAW 32. (1996) (discussing section 1385).
Victor S. Sze, Note and Comment, A Tale of Three Strikes, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
1047 (1995) (discussing the impact of the Three Strikes law).
Steven M. Vartabedian, The Limits: Without Limitations, 23 PAC. L.J. 105 (1992)
(discussing section 667).
Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes and the Romero Case, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643
(1997) (discussing the impact of the Romero ruling).
SHAUNA ALBRIGHT
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E. A defendant may appeal a judgment of conviction entered on a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere without filing the required statement of grounds and
obtaining an executed certificate of probable cause from the trial court if the
defendant alleges solely that errors resulted in the trial court hearings for the
purpose of ascertaining the degree of the crime and penalty to impose and does
not challenge the validity of the plea. The notice of appeal must state these
grounds expressly or impliedly to become operative.
People v. Lloyd, Supreme Court of California, Decided March 16, 1998, 17 Cal. 4th
658, 951 P.2d 1191, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224.
Facts. California Penal Code section 1237.5 and Rule 31(d) of the California
Rules of Court state that a defendant is prohibited from appealing a judgment of
conviction resulting from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless: (1) the
defendant files a written statement under oath with the trial court, reasonably
contesting the "legality of the proceedings;" and (2) the trial court executes and
files a certificate of probable cause. An exception to the rule exists if the defendant
seeks review to challenge the legitimacy of a search or seizure, or challenges the
"adversary hearings conducted by the trial court for the purpose of determining the
degree of the crime and the penalty to be imposed," and does not contest the
validity of the plea. The notice of appeal must state the above grounds to become
operative.
The defendant, Lloyd, robbed an individual at knife point in San Pedro and
was arrested soon thereafter. The defendant was charged with a serious violent
felony, which invoked the "Three Strikes" law due to Lloyd's past convictions of
serious felonies. Originally, Lloyd pleaded not guilty, but later withdrew the plea
and entered a plea of nolo contendere to "spare the victim." Lloyd hoped that a
pending decision before the Supreme Court of California would hold favorably
towards him regarding the Three Strikes law. At the defendant's trial, the court
stated that it would have vacated one or more of the prior findings against the
defendant under the Three Strikes law, but did not believe it had the authority to
do so. When the Supreme Court handed down a judgment which held that a trial
court has authority to vacate a prior serious or felony conviction under the Three
Strikes law, Lloyd appealed. The People moved to dismiss Lloyd's appeal, alleging
that Lloyd had not adhered to California Penal Code section 1237.5 and California
Rule of Court 31(d) because a statement of grounds was not submitted and a
certificate of probable cause by the trial court had not been executed and filed.
Lloyd's notice of appeal did not expressly state the grounds of appeal, which
presented the problem of whether or not the notice was operative.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal's decision that dismissed Lloyd's appeal,
the California Supreme Court remanded the cause for reinstatement. The court
held that Lloyd's appeal was operative even though the notice of appeal stated,
"[d]efendant hereby appeals from the judgment . . ." with the printed word
"judgment" crossed out and the handwritten word "sentence" written above it
because the sentence was imposed after the entry of the plea. The court reiterated
that a notice of appeal must be "liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency,"
according Rule 31(b). Rejecting the argument that a notice of appeal must
expressly state that the appeal is based "on grounds... occurring after entry of the
plea that do not challenge its validity," the court held that an implied statement will
suffice.
Because the grounds for Lloyd's appeal resulted after the entry of his plea and
prior to his sentence, which was imposed six months after his plea was entered, the
appeal did not warrant dismissal. Also, because the grounds of Lloyd's appeal "did
not challenge the validity" of Lloyd's appeal within the meaning of Rule 31 (d), the
appeal did not warrant dismissal. Because the trial court erred in its decision that
it believed it did not have the authority to vacate Lloyd's prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions under the Three Strikes law, Lloyd's appeal was granted
and the court of appeal's decision to dismiss was reversed.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237.5 (West 1998).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A)(iii) (West 1998).
CAL. R. CT. 31 (d).
Case Law:
People v. Superior Ct. (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d
789 (1996) (holding that a trial court has the authority to vacate prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions in regard to the Three Strikes law).
People v. Ward, 66 Cal. 2d 571, 426 P.2d 881, 58 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1967) (holding
that an exception to the general rule of section 1237.5 exists if the defendant
contends solely that errors occurred in the hearings and does not dispute the
validity of the plea guilty or nolo contendere).
Legal Texts:
22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3651 (1985) (generally discussing when a
certificate of probable cause is not needed).
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22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3367 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (discussing violent
and serious felonies including the "Three Strikes Law").
6 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Appeal § 3141
(2d ed. 1989) (discussing when the statutory grounds are not expandable
concerning the right to appeal after a guilty or nolo contendere plea).
6 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Appeal § 3139
(2d ed. 1989) (discussing in general the conditions of the statute concerning the
right to appeal after a guilty or nolo contendere plea).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
George Nicholson, Administrative & Judicial Duties in the Trial Court After a
Guilty or No Contest Plea, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 573 (March 1994) (discussing
generally the requirements of Penal Code section 1237.5 and exceptions to the
code).
William Thornbury, What Is the Meaning of Three Strikes and You Are Out
Legislation?, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 303 (1995) (discussing the three strikes
legislation in general).
Major Terry Elling, Guilty Plea Inquiries: Do We Care Too Much?, 134 MIL. L.
REV. 195, 242 (Fall 1991) (discussing the requirements and effects of a guilty and
nolo contendere plea).
Allison C. Goodman et al., Procedural Issues, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 911, 943
(Spring 1994) (discussing generally the effects of guilty and nolo contendere
pleas).
William Athanas, Lack of Knowledge Concerning Deportation Consequences Does
Not Invalidate Nolo Contendere Plea, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 607 (1995)
(discussing knowledge requirements for nolo contendere pleas).
ALISON RYAN
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F. The failure of a prosecutor, or any agency acting on the prosecutor's behalf,
to turn over possible exculpatory evidence to a defendant will be charged
against the prosecutor, despite any actual knowledge by the prosecution of the
evidence or any lack of bad faith by any party. The prosecutor has an
affirmative duty to search out exculpatory evidence and any failed attempt to
transmit the exculpatory evidence will not be sufficient to meet the due process
requirements that the rule is meant to protect. However, non-disclosure will
give rise to a denial of due process only when the evidence is material.
In re Brown, Supreme Court of California, Decided April 2, 1998, 17 Cal. 4th 873,
952 P.2d 715, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698.
Facts. The defendant, Brown, opened fire on police officers in an Orange County
bar, killing one officer and seriously wounding two other officers and two civilians.
The state charged the defendant with first degree murder. The defendant had a
history of extensive drug use, including phencyclidine (PCP), and asserted a
defense of diminished capacity based on methamphetamine intoxication. The
Orange County Sheriff-Coroner Department of Forensic Science Services
performed two toxicology tests of the defendant's blood. A gas chromatography
mass spectrometry (GC/MS) tested negative for PCP, however a radioactive
immunoassay (RIA) tested positive for PCP. The RIA test results were noted on
a lab worksheet, but because the crime lab considered the GC/MS test as final and
more reliable, the results sheet listed the defendant as negative for PCP drug use.
A notation on the defendant's worksheet indicated that the defendant had received
a copy of the positive drug results as well as the negative result sheet, but no copy
of the worksheet was ever received by either the defendant or the prosecutor.
At trial, the prosecutor rebutted the defendant's claim of methamphetamine
intoxication with the negative test results. A jury found the defendant guilty of first
degree murder and of the special circumstance of intentionally killing a peace
officer during the course of his duties. The defendant was sentenced to death. On
automatic appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the jury's finding. The
defendant then sought a writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court
based upon the prosecution's alleged error, based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), in failing to forward the RIA test results. The supreme court issued an
order to show cause and an order of reference to a referee to determine: 1) whether
the prosecution disclosed the RIA test to the defendant; and 2) how the two
different test results could be reconciled. The referee found that the prosecutor had
disclosed the RIA test and that the tests were reconciled by the fact that the RIA
test was unreliable.
Holding. Reversing the findings of the referee, the supreme court found that the
prosecution had not disclosed the RIA test to the defendant. Specifically, the court
found that because the prosecutor had no knowledge of the positive test, it would
be impossible for the prosecutor to have disclosed such information, andthus any
734
[Vol. 26: 683, 1999] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
evidence even indicating that the crime lab had disclosed the information was
irrelevant.
Relying on Brady and its progeny, which held that the prosecution will be
responsible for disclosing any possibly exculpatory evidence known by the
prosecutor or any agency working for the government to the defendant, the Brown
court further held that the prosecution would remain on the hook for any Brady
violations, regardless of the prosecution's actual knowledge of the exculpatory
evidence or the crime lab's attempt to transmit the worksheet, because'to hold
otherwise would deny the defendant his due process rights.
The court emphasized that the duty placed on the prosecution to disclose is
non-delegable to other agencies working for the prosecution so far as the
prosecutor remains the ultimate party responsible for any non-compliance by any
of the parties. The court held that such a responsibility is equivalent to an
affirmative duty on the part of the prosecution to seek out exculpatory evidence
because the prosecution will be imputed with the knowledge that its agencies have
and will be ultimately responsible if such information is not disclosed. Although
harsh, the court reasoned that it was the only way to satisfy the defendant's right
to due process.
The supreme court addressed the second Brady prong, the remedy allowed,
recognizing that only material non-disclosures merit court action. The court held
that failing to disclose the positive results of the RIA test was material. The court
found that there was no evidence to indicate that the RIA test was innately
inaccurate and that it was possible that each test was accurate. The court opined
that it was not the defendant's burden to show that the verdict would have been
different with the non-disclosed evidence, only that the evidence was material
enough to cause a lack of confidence in the verdict. The court held that the
defendant's reliance upon a methamphetaine intoxication during trial was crucial
to establishing materiality because the non-disclosed evidence would have allowed
the defendant to refocus the defense on a credible theory of PCP intoxication, as
well as to diffuse or negate the negative test results the prosecution introduced.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (establishing a criminal defendant's right to due process).
Case Law:
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (seminal case in this area holding that the
prosecution has a duty to disclose any material exculpatory evidence to a
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defendant).
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that failure of a defendant to
request exculpatory evidence will not exclude a prosecutor's duty to disclose).
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (defining Brady's materiality
standard and eliminating the distinction between undisclosed evidence that is
substantively exculpatory or for impeachment).
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (holding that determination of materiality
for Brady disclosures is based upon a totality effect of all supposed evidence and
not on the basis of each piece of evidence on its own).
United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that the
rights to exculpatory evidence conferred under Brady are absolute only as to
disclosure and not timing; therefore Brady entrusts when such disclosures must be
made to the district court's case-by-case evaluation).
Legal Texts:
21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2847 (1985 & Supp. 1997) (discussing
prosecution's affirmative duty to preserve and disclose material evidence that may
possibly be favorable to the defendant).
19 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 2075 (1985) (discussing the due process
implications from material evidence non-disclosure and the prosecution's
affirmative duty to produce such evidence in certain situations).
3 B.E. WIrKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Effect of Nondisclosure § 1781 (3d ed.
1986) (discussing the materiality standard for error in non-disclosure of favorable
exculpatory evidence).
3 B.E. WTKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Suppression by Prosecution: Federal Cases
§ 1779A (3d ed. 1986) (discussing suppression by the prosecution of favorable
evidence to the defendant).
CAL. PRAC. GUIDE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Special Duty Owed by
Prosecuting Attorney, ch. 8-A:30 (1997) (discussing the prosecutor's ethical
obligation to disclose possible exculpatory evidence, including disclosures that may
negate guilt, mitigate the degree of the offence, or reduce the appropriate
punishment to a defendant in order to ensure a fair and impartial trial).
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Law Review and Journal Articles:
Emily D. Quinn, Comment, Standards of Materiality Governing the Prosecutorial
Duty to Disclose Evidence to the Defense, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 147 (1989)
(discussing the standards of materiality for Brady disclosures related to voluntary
disclosure by prosecutors or from defense counsel requests).
Richard J. Oparil, Making the Defendant's Case: How Much Assistance Must the
ProsecutorProvide?, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 447 (1986) (discussing the affirmative
duty of prosecutors to either test evidence or preserve evidence in order to allow
the defendant to conduct tests that may be exculpatory).
Robert Hochman, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in
Criminal Trials, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1673 (1996) (clarifying the obligations Brady
imposes, especially on prosecutors to search out exculpatory evidence as well as
the duties Brady set forth for all state agencies).
Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L. J. 957 (1989) (outlining the workings of Brady in the context of a
prosecutor's guilty plea negotiations with the defendant).
Christian F. Dubia, Jr., Note, The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Unrequested
Evidence: United States v. Agurs, 4 PEPP. L. REV. 435 (1977) (discussing the
impact of United States v. Agurs materiality of non-disclosure on prosecutorial
non-disclosure).
A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Promises of Favorable Treatment Made to
Witnesses for the Prosecution, 94 HARV. L. REV. 887 (criticizing Agurs and
discussing the prosecutor's responsibility of disclosing promises made to
prosecution witnesses).
JENNIFER VANSE
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G. A tort action of public disclosure of private facts against a television
producer is appropriately dismissed in summary judgment because coverage of
a car accident scene and helicopter rescue is 'newsworthy,' which acts as a
complete bar to a public disclosure action; however, the tort action of intrusion
may appropriately proceed because a reasonable jury could find that the
camera operator intruded into a private place, conversation, or matter in a
manner highly offensive to a reasonable person; and further, news organizations
are not afforded the same First Amendment protections in news gathering as
are given when publishing news.
Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., Supreme Court of California, Decided June 1,
1998, 18 Cal. 4th 200, 955 P.2d 469, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843.
Facts. A mother and son who were severely injured in an automobile accident
sued the television producer of "On Scene: Emergency Response," who filmed
portions of the accident scene and the helicopter flight to the hospital and later
aired the film on television. The filming included a camera operator that surveyed
and filmed the scene of the accident and rode along while filming the helicopter
flight to the hospital. Additionally, a wireless microphone was placed on the flight
nurse, which recorded conversations between the plaintiff and the nurse while on
the ground and in flight.
The plaintiff's complaint included two causes of action for invasion of
privacy, one based on the defendants' public disclosure of private facts and the
other based on intrusion for taping the rescue in the first place. The trial court
granted summaryjudgment on both causes of action for the defendant, based on the
finding that the "accident and rescue were matters of public interest and public
affairs." The court of appeal reversed on limited grounds, finding that a triable
issue of fact remained regarding the public disclosure of the helicopter flight
portion of the story because the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the helicopter. Further, the court of appeal reversed and remanded the intrusion
cause of action, finding that the trial court should have balanced the "plaintiffs'
privacy rights against defendants' First Amendment interest in recording the
rescue" instead of allowing a complete defense of newsworthiness.
Holding. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the court of appeal's finding
as to the remand of the intrusion claim and reversed as to the remand of the public
disclosure of private facts claim. The court held that the broadcast of the accident
material was "newsworthy as a matter of law," which made summary judgment in
favor of the defendants appropriate as to the public disclosure of private facts
claim. The court, however, held that triable issues existed as to the intrusion claim
and that a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff's privacy was invaded when
the camera operator rode along on the helicopter and when the camera operator
recorded confidential conversations at the scene of the accident and during the
helicopter flight. Further, the court held that no First Amendment privilege existed
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to allow the defendant to intrude in the plaintiff's private space or communications.
The court stated the elements of the public disclosure tort as "public
disclosure of a private fact which would be offensive and objectionable to the
reasonable person and which is not of legitimate public concern." The court
focused almost exclusively on the final element of "presence or absence of
legitimate public concern" or "newsworthiness." The court found that if the matter
published is newsworthy, the public disclosure action is completely barred both
constitutionally (through the First Amendment) and at common law.
The court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the history of and policy behind
what has been found newsworthy. The approach settled on was one that "balances
the public's right to know against the plaintiffs privacy interest by drawing a
protective line at the point the material revealed ceases to have any substantial
connection to the subject matter of the newsworthy report." The standard
appropriately, the court stated, gave editors and journalists broad discretion to
publish anything in which the public may "reasonably be expected to have a
legitimate interest."
Connecting the newsworthy standard with the facts of the case, the court
found that automobile accidents and rescues are areas which are, as a matter of law,
issues of legitimate public concern. Accordingly, the court found that summary
judgment was proper on publication of private facts claim.
Turning to the intrusion into private places tort, the court stated the elements
as "intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, in a manner highly
offensive to a reasonable person." The court found that a jury could find that the
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of the rescue
helicopter and in her conversations with the flight rescue nurse. Additionally, the
court looked to California Penal Code section 632 (The Invasion of Privacy Act)--
which prohibits recording of any "confidential communication"--as statutory
recognition of the prohibition on intrusion.
Next, the court stated that a reasonable jury could regard recording the
plaintiff's conversation with rescue personnel and the presence of the camera
operator in the helicopter as "highly offensive to a reasonable person." Finally, the
court explored the First Amendment protection of the press during news gathering.
The court found that the constitutional protection of news gathering is much
narrower than the protection of published material. In fact, the court concluded
that: "the press has no recognized constitutional privilege to violate generally
applicable laws in pursuit of material." Thus, the court allowed remand for trial
regarding the plaintiff's action for intrusion.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... ").
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are... obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.").
CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West Supp. 1999) (imposing criminal penalties on those
who, without the consent of all parties, record confidential communications).
Case Law:
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that the press enjoys
no privilege or immunity from generally applicable laws).
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (finding that if a journalist lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance, state officials
may not constitutionally punish publication).
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (finding that press publication of
a fact that is a matter of public record cannot sustain an invasion of a privacy cause
of action as a matter of law).
Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792,608 P.2d 716, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1980) (most
recent previous California Supreme Court decision discussing public disclosure of
private facts; includes discussion of the definition and breadth of who is a public
figure).
Miller v. National Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1987)
(news organization taping the work of medical personnel; adopted elements of
intrusion cause of action).
Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983)
(defining and giving the elements of the public disclosure of private facts cause of
action).
Noble v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1973)
(finding that a person has an exclusive right to occupancy in a hospital room so that
one who encroaches upon that without permission is invading privacy).
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Legal Texts:
Intrusion by News-Gathering Entity as Invasion of Right of Privacy, 69 A.L.R.4th
1059 (1990) (general survey of nationwide cases regarding news organizations and
intrusion claims).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) ("One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) ("One who gives publicity to
a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public.").
2 B.E. WrriN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Invasion of
Privacy § 1116 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing generally the state right to privacy,
including the state constitutional right and the Invasion of Privacy Act).
2 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, California
Invasion of Privacy Act, §§ 2468-2471 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing specifically the
statutory Invasion of Privacy Act).
5 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, Intrusion into Private
Affairs, §§ 580-581 (9th ed. 1988) (cites elements and cases to prove intrusion
claim).
5 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, Public Disclosure of Private
Facts §§ 582-583 (9th ed. 1988) (cites elements and cases to prove public
disclosure of private facts claim).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Dennis F. Hernandez, Current Developments in Privacy Litigation, 523 PLI/PAT
263 (1998) (overview of all invasion of privacy torts and current decisions across
the nation).
Andrew B. Sims, Foodfor the Lions: Excessive DamagesforNewsgathering Torts
and the Limitations of Current First Amendment Doctrines, 78 B.U. L. REv. 507
(1998) (general discussion of current balance between invasion of privacy torts and
First Amendment protection for newsgathering activities).
Geoff Dendy, Note, The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort,
85 KY. L.J. 147 (1997) (general discussion of the public disclosure of private facts
cause of action and the effect of the newsworthiness defense, especially
considering the First Amendment and recent Supreme Court interpretations).
Victor A. Kovner, Recent Developments in Newsgathering, Invasion of Privacy
and Related Torts, 498 PLI/PAT 539 (1997) (overview of recent cases and
developments in newsgathering techniques and invasion of privacy tort actions).
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957 (1989) (discussing the philosophical and
policy foundations of the common law invasion of privacy torts).
CHRISTOPHER JETER
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H. A prosecutor's duty to disclose witness information pursuant to California
Penal Code section 1054.1 is limited to "witnesses" and not information
regarding defense witnesses; thus, a prosecutor's failure to disclose information
regarding the witness' credibility is not discoverable and did not violate the
defendant's right to due process.
People v. Tillis, Supreme Court of California, Decided June 18, 1998, 18 Cal. 4th
284, 956 P.2d 409, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 447.
Facts. California Penal Code section 1054.1 requires prosecutors to disclose
potential witnesses to the defense. The defendant, Marcellous Lee Tillis, was
convicted of multiple crimes stemming from his involvement in a shooting. At
trial, the defense called Dr. Stephen Pittel, a psychologist, who testified as an
expert that the defendant suffered from a history of depression and possible brain
damage because the defendant habitually abused heroin. On cross-examination by
the prosecutor, Dr. Pittel admitted that Dr. Pittel was arrested for using drugs
during a lunch break while he was testifying as an expert in a similar case. Defense
counsel did not object to this line of questioning by the prosecutor. The trial court
ruled the impeachment material relevant and admissible.
The defendant claimed that the prosecutor's failure to disclose the information
about Tillis' drug use was a violation of California criminal discovery statutes. The
defendant argued that the failure to disclose the information violated his right to
due process of law and was in violation of California Penal Code section 1054.1.
The trial court allowed the prosecutor's impeachment material and the defendant
was convicted. The court of appeal disagreed and said that the prosecution violated
California Penal Code section 1054.1 and violated the defendant's right to due
process of law. However, the court of appeal stated that the prosecution's errors
were harmless and affirmed the defendant's convictions. The California Supreme
Court granted review to consider whether the prosecutor had the duty to disclose
the impeachment evidence to the defendant pursuant to the applicable discovery
principles and, if so, whether the failure to disclose the impeachment evidence
prejudiced the defendant.
Holding. Affirming the court of appeal's decision on different grounds, the
California Supreme Court held that the impeachment evidence was not
discoverable under California Penal Code section 1054.1.
California Penal Code section 1054.1 requires the prosecution to disclose the
names and addresses of witnesses it intends to call and "all relevant real evidence
seized or obtained as a part of the investigation of the bffenses charged." The court
reasoned that absent affirmative information that the prosecution intended to call
a specific witness to testify regarding the impeachment material, the impeachment
material was not discoverable pursuant to California Penal Code section 1054.1.
Moreover, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the prosecutor denied
the defendant due process because the prosecutor did not disclose to the defense
evidence it obtained as a result of defense supplied discovery. The court stated that
the prosecutor must only disclose evidence if the defense is required to do the same
following discovery of the prosecution's witnesses. The defense does not have a
duty to disclose such information, and therefore the prosecutor does not have such
a duty.
Accordingly, the prosecutor's failure to disclose the impeachment material
regarding Dr. Pittel was not discoverable under California Penal Code section
1054.1 because the defendant could not establish that the prosecutor intended to
call any witness to substantiate the information.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (Due Process Clause).
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(c) ("Discovery in criminal cases shall be reciprocal in
nature").
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 1998) (prosecuting attorney; disclosure of
materials to defendant).
Case Law:
Izazaga v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 356, 815 P.2d 304, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1991)
(holding reciprocity under Due Process Clause requires notice that defendant will
have the opportunity to discover prosecutor's rebuttal witnesses).
In re Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th 122, 851 P.2d 42, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248 (1993) (holding
that the presence of a witness that the counsel's investigator had interviewed, and
counsel's request that the court order the witness to appear on the day the case was
in trial, was sufficient information to lead the trial court to determine counsel's
intent to call that witness).
Sandeffer v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal. App. 4th 672, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261 (1993)
(holding that appellate courts should not speculate about witnesses whose identity
or existence is not on record).
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (holding that a discovery statute that
required the defense to provide the names of alibi witnesses to the prosecutor, but
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did not require the prosecutor to provide names of rebuttal witnesses to the defense,
was unconstitutional).
Legal Texts:
21 CAL. JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 2844 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing
disclosure of names and addresses of witnesses prosecution intends to call).
21 CAL. JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 2846 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (discussing
prosecution's disclosure requirements).
2 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Discovery & Production of Evidence §
1663 (3d ed. 1986) (generally discussing requirements for discovery).
5 B.E. WrrKIN & NoRMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Trial § 2498A
(2d ed. Supp. 1997) (generally discussing a comprehensive and exclusive system
of discovery for criminal trials).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Michael Alden Miller, California Supreme Court Survey, Criminal Law, 21 PEPP.
L. REV. 320, 322-23 (1993) (discussing the reciprocal discovery requirements of
Proposition 115).
Steve Holden, Casenote, Izazaga v. Superior Court: Affirming the Public's Cry to
Unshackle the Criminal Prosecution System, 23 PAC. L.J. 1721, 1789-90 (1992)
(generally discussing that the prosecution must disclose the names and addresses
of all persons intended to be called as witnesses).
Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1982) (generally discussing the
disclosure requirement of impeachment evidence).
ANN KIM
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I. The Kelly/Frye foundational test for the admissibility of evidence based upon
new scientific technique is composed of three prongs. The first prong, which
requires that reliability be established by showing that the technique has gained
general scientific acceptance, can be established if a previously published
appellate decision has already upheld the admissibility of that technique.
However, the third prong, which requires that the procedures used in the
instant case complied with those of the generally accepted standard, is case
specific and cannot rely on previously published decisions.
People v. Venegas, Supreme Court of California, Decided May 11, 1998, 18 Cal.
4th 47, 954 P.2d 525, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 262.
Facts. In 1989, a hotel guest was assaulted and raped upon attempting to enter her
hotel room. The defendant informed her that he had a knife and, while in her room
for approximately iwo hours, raped her, cut her with the knife, hit her, and bound
her with bedding and an electrical cord. Medical personnel later took hair, blood,
and saliva samples from both the victim and the defendant. After sending these
samples to the FBI laboratory in Washington, D.C. for DNA testing, it was
reported that the defendant' s DNA profile "matched" the DNA profiles from swabs
taken from the crime scene and found in the victim's body.
An initial Kelly/Frye hearing determined that the prosecution would be
permitted to present certain restricted results of DNA testing utilizing the FBI's
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism ("RFLP") methodology. On the day
of this ruling, the court of appeal in People v. Pizarro, 10 Cal. App. 4th 57, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 436 (1992), held that the prosecution must demonstrate, using impartial
expert testimony, the general scientific acceptance of the FBI's RFLP methodology
despite the fact that the court of appeal had already determined in People v. Axell,
235 Cal. App. 3d 836, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (1991), that Cellmark's RFLP
methodology is accepted in the scientific community.
Relying on the ruling in Pizarro, the defendant sought, but failed, to have the
trial court's initial Kelly/Frye ruling set aside in the court of appeal. Following this
failed attempt at relief in the court of appeal, the defendant's request to reopen the
Kelly/Frye hearing at the trial court level was granted. The trial court permitted the
cross-examination of an FBI agent in charge of the prosecution's DNA testing, and
allowed testimony of a defense expert who testified that the FBI did not follow
correct scientific procedures.
This re-opened hearing, however, did not convince the trial court to further
restrict the admissibility of DNA evidence and, ultimately, the jury returned a
verdict of guilty on all counts. On appeal, the court of appeal reversed the trial
court decision, holding that: (1) the prosecution failed to prove the general
scientific acceptance of the FBI's RFLP methodology, and (2) the FBI did not
comply with the correct procedures for RFLP analysis. The California Supreme
Court granted the Attorney General's request for review and affirmed the court of
appeal's decision on the second, but not the first ground stated by the court of
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appeal.
Holding. The California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the judgment of
the court of appeal on the grounds that the prosecution had not shown that the FBI
had complied with the correct procedures for conducting RFLP analysis. However,
the California Supreme Court rejected the argument set forth by the court of appeal
that the prosecution failed to prove general scientific acceptance of RFLP
methodology.
The Kelly/Frye foundational test for the admissibility of evidence based upon
new scientific technique requires the proponent of such evidence to set forth a
preliminary showing that the technique has gained general acceptance in the
scientific community. Justice Baxter, writing for the court, explained that this
requirement contains an important corollary, which provides that previously
published appellate decisions that have already established the general scientific
acceptance of a certain technique set precedent for subsequent trials, so long as
general scientific opinion of that technique has not since materially changed. The
prosecution at the trial court level relied on the California appellate decision in
People v. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d 836, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (1991), which
established the general scientific acceptance of RFLP analysis. While the specific
methodology employed by the FBI in conducting RFLP analysis may differ from
the generally accepted methodology, this query is not the concern of Kelly/Frye's
first prong. This prong requires only the general scientific acceptance of RFLP
analysis as a technique.
Turning its attention to the court of appeal's second ground for reversal, the
California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's holding that the FBI had
not complied with the correct procedures for conducting RFLP analysis. Unlike
the first prong of the Kelly/Frye test, which requires general scientific acceptance
of the technique itself, the third prong queries whether the actual procedures
utilized in the instant case complied with those that are generally accepted in the
scientific community. As such, the requirements of the third prong of the
Kelly/Frye test can not be met merely by setting forth precedent of a previously
published decision. This prong, rather, requires a case-by-case analysis. After a
careful review of the record below and a thorough overview of RFLP analysis, the
supreme court concluded that the FBI had not, in fact, complied with the generally
accepted procedures for conducting RFLP analysis. The National Research
Council's "modified ceiling" method has gained general scientific acceptance as
a means of calculating the statistical probability that a DNA sample "matches" that
of a defendant. In its RFLP analysis, the FBI failed to use the correct bin
procedure, as recommended by the National Research Council, in their DNA
calculations-opting for the floating bin rather than the fixed bin-and such an error
affects the admissibility of the evidence, not merely the weight of the evidence.
REFERENCES
Case Law: ,
People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976)
(discussing California's adoption of a slightly modified federal Frye test for the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence).
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (discussing the federal
evidentiary standard for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that the federal
Frye test has been abrogated by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
People v. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d 836, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (1991) (discussing the
general scientific acceptance of restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP)
analysis).
People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (1992) (discussing,
in full detail for the nonscientific reader, the processes involved in RFLP analysis).
People v. Pizarro, 10 Cal. App. 4th 57, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436 (1992) (holding that
the prosecution must demonstrate, using impartial expert testimony, the general
scientific acceptance of the FBI's RFLP methodology as compared to Cellmark's
RFLP methodology).
Legal Texts:
2 B.E. WrTKJN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Demonstrative, Experimental and Scientific
Evidence § 864 (3d ed. 1986) (a discussion of the Kelly/Frye test, including a full
analysis of each prong).
2 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Demonstrative, Experimental and Scientific
Evidence §§ 864F-H (3d ed. Supp. 1998) (discussing the general principles of
DNA identification evidence).
WnLIAM E. WEGNER ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE, Civil Trials & Evidence
§§ 8:563-8:624 (The Rutter Group 1997) (discussing the relationship between the
federal and California tests for the admissibility of scientific evidence).
31 CAL. JUR. 3D Evidence §§ 489-516 (1976 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing
the admissibility and effect of expert testimony).
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Law Review and Journal Articles:
Robert Hupe, The Development of DNA Fingerprint Use In Courts of Law, 19 Sw.
U. L. REV. 1045 (1990) (discussing the development of DNA and blood tests for
use in court as well as a comparison between their use in criminal versus civil
trials).
D.H. Kaye, DNA, NAS, NRC, DAB, RFLP, PCR, and More: An Introduction to the
Symposium on the 1996 NRC Report on Forensic DNA Evidence, 37 JURIMETRICS
J. 395 (1997) (discussing DNA evidence with respect to the findings of the
National Research Council).
R. Stephen Kramer, Comment, Admissibility of DNA Statistical Data: A
Proliferation of Misconception, 30 CAL. W. L. REV. 145 (1993) (discussing DNA,
DNA evidence, and the various tests that have been used to effectuate DNA
testing).
Kamrin T. MacKnight, Comment, The Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): The
Second Generation of DNA Analysis Methods Takes The Stand, 9 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 287 (1993) (discussing RFLP analysis, PCR
analysis, and the use of such analyses in criminal trials).
Paul B. Tyler, California Supreme Court Survey, The Kelly-Frye "General
Acceptance" Standard Remains the Rule for Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence: People v. Leahy, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1274 (1995) (discussing California's
formulation of the Kelly/Frye test and its application).
BRETr WATSON
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VI. DAMAGES
A prepayment provision in a short-term loan between a construction loan and
a buyer's permanent loan is a penalty for delinquency in meeting the
contractual interest payments, and thus unenforceable, if it bears no
relationship to the potential damages the defendant would incur from a late
interest payment.
Ridgley v. Topa Thrift and Loan Ass'n, Supreme Court of California, Decided April
20, 1998, 17 Cal. 4th 970, 953 P.2d 484, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 378.
Facts. The plaintiff, Robert M. Ridgley, a property developer, purchased a parcel
in order to build and sell a custom home. In late 1990, the home was near complete
and was placed on the market for sale. However, because the construction loan that
the plaintiff had secured was coming due, the plaintiff negotiated a bridge loan with
the defendant, Topa Thrift and Loan Association.
The parties agreed on the terms of a loan in the amount of $2.3 million and
a promissory note (Note), assignment of rents, and deeds of trust were executed on
December 21, 1990. Pursuant to the terms of the Note, interest payments were due
on the twenty-first day of every month.
The Note was on a preprinted form provided by Topa and included the
following language:
Borrower may at any time prepay the outstanding principal balance of the Note in
whole or in part; provided, however, Borrower will pay to Lender a prepayment
charge of six (6) months' interest at the rate in effect at the time of prepayment on
the amount prepaid. Such a prepayment charge will be made whether such
prepayments are made voluntarily, involuntarily or upon acceleration of this Note.
No such prepayment charge will be made on prepayments made five (5) or more
years after the date of this Note.
The plaintiff objected to the provision and Topa added a typewritten addendum to
the Note. The addendum read:
Provided All Scheduled Payments Have Been Received Not More Than 15 Days
After Their Scheduled Due Date, And Further Provided That There Have Been No
Other Defaults Under The Terms Of This Note Or Any Other Now Existing Or
Future Obligation Of Borrower To Topa, Then No Prepayment Charge Will Be
Assessed If This Loan Is Paid In Full After June 21, 1991.
In late 1991, pursuant to the plaintiff s request, Topa agreed to change the due
date for the interest payments from the twenty-first to the first of each subsequent
month. The plaintiff made his payment due January 1 within a ten day grace
period, and made no further payments until March 12, 1992. By February, the
property was in escrow and scheduled to close in April. On March 3, Topa agreed
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to accept payments by the plaintiff in the amount of $19,500 on March 12, 1992
and April 12, 1992. The plaintiff timely made the March 12, 1992 payment.
Topa made a payment demand to the escrow officer for $2,365,502, which
included a prepayment charge, a demand fee, and a late charge, purportedly for the
March payment, these charges and fees together totaling $114,622. The plaintiff
objected to these assessments and Topa agreed to release the deed of trust on the
property; however, it maintained the $114,622 balance as a lien on the plaintiff's
home. The plaintiff paid this balance, plus accrued interest, when he refinanced
his home.
The plaintiff sued Topa for breach of contract and money paid by mistake.
The trial court found that the prepayment clause was a late charge and an
unenforceable forfeiture penalty, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The
court of appeal reversed and held that because the penalty was triggered by the
prepayment, it was a valid prepayment provision and was not an invalid late charge
or forfeiture.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that the prepayment provision was a penalty for delinquency in meeting
the contractual interest payments, and thus was unenforceable because it bore no
relationship to the potential damages Topa would incur from a late interest
payment. Under the provision, the court reasoned, any late payment or other
default by the plaintiff would result in a severe penalty--the inability to sell the
property without payment of a sizable preset charge. The court further reasoned
that the purpose of the provision was to coerce timely payment of interest, not to
compensate Topa for interest payments lost through prepayment of principle. The
central question decided by the court was whether the provision contained in the
Note could be viewed as a charge for prepayment of the loan principal or as a
penalty for delinquency in a monthly interest payment. The court looked to section
1671 (b) of the California Civil Code, which applies a strict standard to liquidated
damages clauses in certain contracts, for guidance on the question.
There is a presumption that such a clause is valid unless the party seeking to
invalidate the provision establishes that the provision was unreasonable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the contract. The court determined that a
liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and thus
unenforceable under section 1671(b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the
range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from
a breach. The court found that in the absence of such a relationship, a contractual
clause purporting to predetermine damages must be construed as a penalty.
Furthermore, under California law, a contractual provision that imposes a penalty
is ineffective, and the wronged party may only collect actual damages sustained
when it requires the forfeiture of either money or property without regard to the
actual damage suffered. Pursuant to this principle, charges for late payment of loan
installments are unenforceable where they bear no reasonable relationship to the
injury the creditor might suffer from such late payments.
The court further determined that if the provision were construed as a charge
for prepayment, it would be valid. This is because under the law, contractual
charges for prepayment of the loan principle are generally considered valid
provisions for alternative performance, rather than penalties or liquidated damages
for breach. They are merely a way for the lender to be compensated for interest
lost when the borrower pays the principle prematurely.
The court held that the provision cannot reasonably be regarded as a
prepayment charge, because the condition that limits its operation--the late payment
of interest--is logically unrelated to the charge's purported function as
compensation for prepayment. The provision, rather, is intended to provide
incentive to the borrower to make prompt interest payments. Alone, the court
reasoned, this would not be fatal to the Note, however, because the amount of the
preset charge (six months of interest) was unreasonable, the provision is invalid
and thus, unenforceable.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671(b)-(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (determining that a
liquidated damages provision is unenforceable if it is unreasonable).
CAL. COM. CODE § 2718(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (requiring liquidated
damages clauses in contracts for sales of goods or services to be "reasonable in
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach").
Case Law:
Garrett v. Coast & Southern Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d
1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973) (holding that a prepayment charge, conditioned on
late interest payments, constitutes an unenforceable liquidation of damages).
Meyers v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 38 Cal. App. 3d 544, 113 Cal. Rptr. 358
(1974) (holding that a provision that provides a surcharge compensating the
defendant for prepayment of the principal is valid).
Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1985) (holding a contractual provision imposing a penalty is ineffective, and the
wronged party can collect only actual damages sustained).
Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App. 3d
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303, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1971) (holding that a prepayment provision may bear a
reasonable relationship to damages sustained by the lender and may, therefore, be
valid).
Weber, Lipshie & Co. v. Christian, 52 Cal. App. 4th 645 (1997) (holding that a
liquidated damages provision is not invalid merely because it is intended to
encourage a party to perform).
Legal Texts:
1 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 512 (9th ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1998) (discussing the validity of prepayment penalties in loan contracts as
they are neither liquidated damages clauses nor penalties).
3 B.E. WrTKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Security Transactions in Real
Property § 83 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1998) (discussing prepayment clauses in
mortgages and deeds of trust when the loan is prepaid, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily, and the charge is reasonable).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation in California: Plain Meaning, Parol
Evidence and Use of the "Just Result" Principle, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 557 (1998)
(revealing the difficulties of interpreting contracts and the court's imposition of a
"just result" when parties have not expressed any discoverable intent as to an
unforeseen situation).
Dale A. Whitman, Mortgage Prepayment Clauses: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 40 UCLA L. REV. 851 (1993) (discussing an economic perspective on
mortgage prepayment as support for set legal recommendations).
JESSICA RIGLEY
VII. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A spouse who contributes separate property to the acquisition of community
property is entitled to reimbursement upon dissolution of the marriage from the
original acquisition or community property that is traced from the proceeds of
the original property, absent a written waiver.
In re Marriage of Walrath, Supreme Court of California, Decided April 6, 1998, 17
Cal. 4th 907, 952 P.2d 1124, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 856.
Facts. California Family Code section 2640 states that in the division of the
community estate, unless there is a written waiver, the spouse shall be reimbursed
for his or her separate property contributions to the acquisition or improvement of
community property to the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate
property source. The issue in this case was whether reimbursement is only allowed
from the original acquisition or includes property purchased from the proceeds of
the original acquisition and how the contribution was traced.
Gilbert and Gladys Walrath were married in January 1992. In June of 1992,
Gilbert deeded his separate property house in Lucerne, California to Gilbert and
Gladys as joint tenants. At that time, the property had a market value of $228,000
with a mortgage of $82,000, leaving an equity of $146,000. Gladys used $20,000
of her separate property to pay down the mortgage. In 1993, the couple refinanced
the Lucerne home, borrowing $180,000, of which $60,000 was used to pay off the
existing loan on the Lucerne home, $62,000 to pay off the mortgage on a property
in Nevada, $40,500 to purchase and improve a property in Utah, $16,000 went into
a joint savings account, and the remaining $1,500 was not specified in the record.
When the Walraths separated, less than three years after their marriage, the Lucerne
property decreased in value to $175,000, with a mortgage of $174,000.
The trial court held that the right of reimbursement extended only to the
originally acquired property, the Lucerne home. It determined that Gilbert
contributed eighty-eight percent and Gladys twelve percent of their separate
property to the Lucerne acquisition, and thus granted Gilbert $880 and Gladys $120
from the equity in that property. The court of appeal affirmed and the California
Supreme Court granted review.
Holding. The California Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower courts.
In interpreting what is "property" as used in California Family Code section 2640,
the supreme court determined it "included not only the specific community
property to which the separate property is originally contributed, but also any other
community property that is subsequently acquired from the proceeds of the initial
property, and to which the separate property contribution can be traced." The
court's rationale for the reversal was to encourage diversification of investments,
which would be avoided for fear of losing reimbursement rights. It extended the
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right because of the strong legislative history favoring reimbursement.
The supreme court further held that a spouse who contributes separate
property to the acquisition of community property is entitled to reimbursement
upon dissolution of the marriage from the original acquisition or community
property that is traced from the proceeds of the original property, absent an
enforceable waiver. Originally, in Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d
285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980), the court held that separate property contributions
to community property assets were presumed to be a gift to the community.
Rebutting the presumption required an enforceable agreement by the parties that
the contribution was not a gift. For example, if a spouse used his or her separate
property or a gift from parents to make a down payment on the family home held
in community property, the right to reimbursement was lost if the couple did not
sign a written contract during marriage that the contribution was not a gift.
In 1983, the California Legislature passed California Civil Code section
4800.2, now Family Code section 2640, with the express purpose of overruling the
Lucas decision. The section states that a spouse who made a separate property
contribution to community property is entitled to reimbursement, unless there was
an enforceable agreement that the contribution was a gift.
The issue then became whether the act would be applied retroactively to
property contributed before enactment of the statute on January 1, 1984. In the
instant case, the parties were not married until 1990, and therefore the provision
applied to them, but it was the strong legislative response favoring reimbursement
that caused the court to allow tracing of the contribution.
The court held that this section is not retroactive. The governor issued
emergency legislation requiring the section to apply to all proceedings not final
before January 1, 1984. The court's response was the unanimous pronouncement
in Marriage of Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th 1211, 899 P.2d 1349,44 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1995),
that the interest will not be applied retroactively. In Marriage of Heikes, the
court ruled that the statute was not applied retroactively because the act would
divest the other spouse of a vested property interest in the property that was
previously deemed community property. Taking that right would be a violation of
due process "because it amounted to expropriation." California's interest in a
uniform law of community property distribution was not sufficient to allow a
retroactive application that would divest a spouse of a vested property interest.
After determining there was an overwhelming state preference for
reimbursement, the issue became how it is traced. The supreme court set forth a
formula for that determination. The trial court must determine what percentage of
contribution the spouses made in the original acquisition and what percentage of
its proceeds were used to pay for other property. The right to reimbursement is
limited by the maximum value of the property to which it was contributed. When
the property is insufficient to pay the reimbursement, the reimbursement is divided
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pro rata by contribution.
The court assumed the amount of the refinance was to total equity in the
Lucerne home. The amount of the refinance was $180,000, of which Gilbert
contributed $146,000, or eighty-one percent, and Gladys $20,000, or eleven
percent. The rest of the funds were community property. $60,000 was reinvested
in the Lucerne home, $40,500 in the Utah property, $62,000 in the Nevada
property, and $16,000 into a joint savings account. The spouses received a pro rata
reimbursement of any equity in those properties and the bank account up to those
amounts. In the case of the Lucerne property, the equity was $1,000, which was
divided pro rata, $810 for Gilbert, $110 for Gladys, and $80 for the community.
The record was silent as to the equity in the other property, so the case was
remanded.
The court dismissed Gladys' argument that it was inherently unfair that
reimbursement be paid first and that the community bears the first risk of
deprecation. The court stated the legislative intent "to permit full reimbursement
for separate property contributions indicates that the contributions receive greater
protection from depreciation than the community's interest, provided only that any
appreciation in the value of community assets above the amount of the separate
property contributions to that asset belongs to the community." This means that if
the only equity in the Nevada and Utah properties is the amount of the spouses'
contributions, the community will not be allocated anything, even if community
funds were later contributed to make interest payments or other improvements in
the property.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2640(b) (West 1998) (stating that in the division of the
community estate, unless a party made a written waiver, a spouse shall be
reimbursed for his or her separate property contributions to the acquisition of
community property to the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate
property source).
Case Law:
In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808,614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980),
overruled by CAL. FAM. CODE § 2640 (West 1998) (stating that a party is only
entitled to reimbursement of separate property contributed to the community if
there was a written agreement between the parties. There is a presumption that,
absent an agreement, the party intended the contribution to be a gift).
In re Marriage of Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986)
(stating that community property rights held by a spouse under the Lucas interperati
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on are vested).
In re Marriage of Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th 1211, 899 P.2d 1349, 44 Cal. Rptr. 155
(1995) (stating that section 2640 is not applied retroactively because it would divest
the other spouse of a vested property interest).
In re Marriage of Stoll, 63 Cal. App. 4th 837, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 506 (1998) (stating
that a spouse is entitled to render an opinion on the source of the funds that
purchased the community property to prove a claim of the right to reimbursement).
Legal Texts:
11 B.E. WrrK1N, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property § 199 (9th
ed. Supp. 1997) (stating that there is no retroactive application of section 2640 for
quasi-community property acquired before January 1, 1985).
11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property § 264 (9th
ed. Supp. 1997) (stating that section 2640 is retroactively applied where a vested
property interest is not affected).
11 B.E. WrTKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property § 268 (9th
ed. Supp. 1997) (stating that reimbursement is made without interest payment or
adjustment for change in value, but that payment may not exceed the value of the
property).
2 HOGOBOOM & KING, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE, Family Law § 8:466 (Rutter
Group 1997) (stating that the reimbursement award comes off the top of the
community property item in question before the community property interest in the
property is divided).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Ira Lurvey, California Supreme Court Family Law Issues in 1995, 16 NO. 4
Fair$hare 7 (1996) (stating that Marriage of Heikes settled the law that section
2640 is not applied retroactively).
Litigation Roundup, 16 NO. 4 MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST 8 (1998) (stating that a
spouse's right to reimbursement for a separate property contribution to a
community property acquisition includes property traced from the original
acquisition, unless there is a signed written wavier).
Lesles J. Newman, Family Law Corner: The Payback, 40 ORANGE COUNTY LAW.
40 (1998) ("FAM. CODE § 2640 under Walrath and Stoll greatly expands the right
to separate property reimbursement from community assets.").
SARA DAYTON
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VIII. EMINENT DOMAIN
The California Coastal Commission's erroneous assertion of permit jurisdiction
over a lot line adjustment that prevented any economically viable use of the
property is merely a developmental delay and does not constitute a regulatory
taking of the property. Absent evidence that a delay was caused by anything
other than a bona fide dispute between the two parties, a governmental mistake
cannot be classified as a taking.
Landgate, Inc., v. California Coastal Comm'n, Supreme Court of California,
Decided April 30, 1998, 17 Cal. 4th 1006, 953 P.2d 1188, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841.
Facts. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
If a government's activities result in a taking of all use of property, then the
government must provide compensation for the period during which the taking
occurred. In October of 1990, the plaintiff, Landgate, Inc., bought a sloped lot in
Malibu Hills and received county approval in concept for grading and building
plans for a large home. The lot was within the coastal zone and therefore was
subject to development restrictions imposed by the California Coastal Act of 1976.
Under the act, the Coastal Commission had jurisdiction over the area in which
Landgate's property was located. After purchasing the property, Landgate applied
to the Commission for permits to build the house and related structures. At its
December 1990 and February 1991 meetings, the Commission objected to
Landgate' s proposed development plans because it was below the allowable height
contained in the Malibu LUP, the amount of grading required was too much, and
the Commission had not approved the lot line adjustment obtained from the county
by Landgate's predecessor in interest.
In March 1991, Landgate filed a petition for writ of mandate against the
Commission, asserting that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over the lot
line adjustment. The petition was conjoined with a complaint, arguing that a taking
of property had occurred without just compensation and seeking damages and
declaratory relief. In April of 1991, the Commission heard Landgate's request for
reconsideration, but still denied the application because the new proposal did not
constitute new evidence or error of fact or law. Litigation proceeded and in
October 1991, the trial court granted Landgate's petition for writ of mandate. The
trial court did not order the approval of any particular development proposal, but
did order the Commission to consider the subject property to be a legal lot because
the Commission had mistakenly assertedjurisdiction over the lot line. In December
1992, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's decision in an unpublished
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opinion. In February 1993, the Commission again considered Landgate's project
and set forth conditions for building that Landgate did not challenge.
Subsequently, Landgate moved for summary adjudication for the takings claim.
The trial court granted Landgate's motion, ruling that the Commission had
temporarily taken Landgate's property from February 1991 to February 1993. The
court of appeal affirmed the trial court's decision and stated that the delay was not
a reasonable mistake. The California Supreme Court granted review to address the
question of whether the Commission's apparently mistaken assertion ofjurisdiction
of the lot line adjustment led to a temporary taking of Landgate's property.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that an error by a governmental agency in the development approval
process does not amount to a taking if it is part of a reasonable regulatory process
designed to advance legitimate government interests. Even though the error
diminishes the value of the subject property and may result in substantial losses,
the government agency is not liable under the takings clause.
The court did not say that no delays would result in a taking, but rather that
good faith mistakes would not result in the government agency being liable. In
certain situations, it is possible for the delay to be considered a taking, thus
requiring compensation if there is evidence to show that the delay was not a
reasonable result of a mistake. If the non-approval does not advance a legitimate
state interest and is merely a delaying tactic, then the government will be liable for
a taking and must provide just compensation to the person or entity being harmed.
The supreme court rejected the court of appeal's view that the Commission
was motivated by a jurisdictional spat with Landgate because the Commission
expressed frustration over the county's failure to recognize the Commission's
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Commission's point of view was based on the
legitimate environmental concerns, and once required to adhere to a court ruling,
it only imposed conditions to reduce adverse environmental impacts. Part of the
regulatory process is the imposition of certain procedural conditions and
substantive requirements on development and that is what the Commission was
doing. In California, a condition for obtaining a permit for development within the
coastal zone is the procurement of a coastal permit. The Commission's position,
although ultimately legally erroneous, that Landgate or its predecessor failed to
comply with one of the conditions of obtaining a coastal development permit by
illegally reconfiguring the boundaries of the lot, was a plausible position.
In conclusion, the court chose not to accept Landgate's argument because it
had not presented adequate evidence to show that the development delay between
February 1991 and February 1993 was due to anything other than a bona fide
dispute over the legality of Landgate's lot and the Commissioners' jurisdictional
authority over the lot line adjustment. This type of delay is an incident of property
ownership and not a taking of property. While it may be unfortunate that the delay
results in the loss of time and money, the government agency will not be liable for
a good faith mistake.
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REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
U.S. CONST. amend V ("nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law").
CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 15 (providing that no person may be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law).
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30519 (West 1998) (discussing permit jurisdiction).
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30000 (West 1998) (providing development restrictions).
CAL. GOVT. CODE § 818.5 (West 1998) (providing that a public entity cannot be
held liable "for an injury caused by the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation
of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization where the public entity
or an employee of the public entity is authorized by enactment to determine
whether or not such authorization should be issued, denied, suspended or
revoked").
Case Law:
First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that
"where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which a taking was effective").
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (eschewing any
set formula for determining when a government regulation goes too far and
becomes a taking).
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (stating that
the requirement of obtaining a permit before engaging in the certain use of a
property does not itself constitute a taking of the property).
Littoral Dev. Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 33 Cal.
App. 4th 211, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 266 (1994) (finding no regulatory taking of property
when delay resulted from factual or legal uncertainties).
Legal Texts:
13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 270 (1989 & Supp. 1998) (discussing due
process generally).
13 CAL. JuR. 3D Constitutional Law § 274 (1989 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the
agencies and persons bound by guaranty).
5 B.E. W1TKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading § 648 (4th ed. 1997 & Supp.
1998) (discussing damage to property).
5 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Administrative Proceedings § 3 (4th ed.
1997 & Supp. 1998) (discussing due process and other constitutional limits).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Karena C. Anderson, Strategic Litigating in Land Use Cases: Del Monte Dune v.
City of Monterey, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 465,501-03 (1998) (generally discussing law
in the area of "takings").
Michael M. Berger, Making the Takings Issue Argument, SD14 ALI-ABA 995,
998-99 (1998) (addressing the issue of normal delays that do not constitute a
taking).
Robert Meltz, Takings Claims Against the Federal Government, SC43 ALI-ABA
57, 76-77 (1998) (discussing damage for takings).
Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the "Impenetrable Jungle ": Navigating the
Boundary Between Land-Use Planning and Environmental Law, 50 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5 (1996) (providing a general discussion in the area of
takings).
Quintin Johnston, Government Control of Urban Land Use: A Comparative Major
Program Analysis, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 373, 446 (1994) (discussing permit
delays).
ANDY ROBERSON
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IX. Independent Contractors
Employees of an independent contractor who are injured by the contractor's
negligence cannot seek recovery in tort against the hiring person under the
peculiar risk doctrine because of the availability of workers' compensation
benefits.
Toland v. Sunland Hous. Group, Inc., Supreme Court of California, Decided June
1, 1998, 18 Cal. 4th 253, 955 P.2d 504, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878.
Facts. Under the doctrine of peculiar risk, a person who hires an independent
contractor to do inherently dangerous work can be liable for tort damages when the
contractor causes injury to others by negligently performing the work. The
doctrine serves to ensure that innocent bystanders or neighboring landowners
injured by the hired contractor's negligence will have a source of compensation
even if the contractor turns out to be insolvent. In December 1992, Timothy
Toland was working for a framing contractor, CLP Construction, Inc., at a housing
development under construction. While helping other CLP employees in raising
a large and heavy framed wall, Toland was injured when the wall fell on him. The
project's owner and general contractor was Sunland Housing Group, Inc. Toland
sought recovery from his employer, CLP Construction, under the Workers'
Compensation Act. He sued Sunland, alleging that raising the wall created a
peculiar risk of injury for which Sunland should have required subcontractor CLP
Construction to take special precautions.
Sunland moved for summary judgment in the trial court, asserting that
Toland's action was barred under the court's then recent decision in Privette v.
Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 689, 854 P.2d 721, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72 (1993), holding
that under the peculiar risk doctrine, the hiring person's liability does not extend
to the hired contractor's employees. Toland argued that Privette had eliminated
peculiar risk liability for employees of independent contractors only in actions
based on section 416 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hiring person liable for
contractor's negligence in spite of providing that the contractor take special
precautions), but that Privette had no effect on an action such as his, which was
brought under section 413 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hiring person who
fails to provide for special precautions liable for contractor's negligence).
The trial court entered summary judgment for Sunland, finding that the
plaintiff, as the employee of an independent contractor, could not recover against
the hiring person under the peculiar risk doctrine. The court of appeal affirmed.
The California Supreme Court granted review.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
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Court held that employees of an independent contractor who are injured by the
contractor's negligence cannot seek recovery in tort against the hiring person under
the peculiar risk doctrine. This is so, irrespective of whether the recovery is sought
under the theory of peculiar risk that the hiring person who fails to provide for
special precautions is liable for the contractor's negligence, or the theory of
peculiar risk that the hiring person is liable for the contractor's negligence in spite
of providing that the contractor take special precautions.
The court noted that under the decision in Privette, even though a person
hiring an independent contractor to do inherently dangerous work can be liable
under the peculiar risk doctrine for failing to see to it that a hired contractor takes
special precautions to protect neighboring property owners or innocent bystanders,
such a person has no obligation to specify the precautions an independent hired
contractor should take for the safety of the contractor's employees. Absent an
obligation, there can be no liability in tort. Thus, Privette bars employees of a
hired independent contractor who are injured by the contractor's negligence from
seeking recovery against the hiring person, irrespective of whether recovery is
based on section 413 or section 416 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The
court believed that in either situation it would be unfair to impose liability on the
hiring person when the liability of the contractor is limited to workers'
compensation coverage.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971) (providing that workers compensation is the
exclusive remedy against employers for injuries sustained by their employees
arising out of and in the course of employment).
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1986) (providing that a civil suit is permitted where
an employee's injury is aggravated by the employer's fraudulent concealment of
the existence of the injury and its connection to the job).
Case Law:
Mackey v. Campbell Constr., 101 Cal. App. 3d 774, 162 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1980)
(holding a peculiar risk may arise out of a contemplated and unsafe method of work
adopted by the independent contractor).
Privette v. Superior Ct., 5 Cal. 4th 689, 854 P.2d 721, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72 (1993)
(holding that the doctrine of peculiar risk should not apply to contractor's own
employees).
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Legal Texts:
65 CAL. JUR. 3D Worker Injury Compensation § 170 (1981 & Supp. 1998) (noting
that an employer's failure to provide safety devices and safeguards will be found
to constitute serious and wilful misconduct).
65 CAL. JuR. 3D Worker Injury Compensation § 173 (1981 & Supp. 1998) (noting
that wilful misconduct of the employer cannot be found from the existence of a
danger which he should have known about had he put his mind to it).
2 B.E. WrTKIN, CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION, Injury Arising Out of
Employment § 220 (9th ed. 1987) (stating that workers' compensation laws require
the injury to arise out of the employment).
2 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION, Injury Arising Out of
Employment § 221 (9th ed. 1987) (noting that causation is satisfied where the work
of the employee brings him into a position of danger at the time and place of
employment).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
William Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J.
584 (1928) (analyzing the entrepreneur theory by which a court can determine
whether the owner-employee or contractor has more characteristics of an
entrepreneur for purposes of imposing liability).
Kathleen McKenna, Comment, The Peculiar Risk Doctrine: High Rise Benefits
For California Construction Workers, 19 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1495 (1986) (noting
it is a common practice in the construction industry for general contractors to hire
subcontractors to do particular jobs).
Mark Monheimer, Comment, Liability for the Torts of Independent Contractors In
California, 44 CAL. L. REV. 762 (1956) (noting liability was imposed where work
created a nuisance).
Harry M. Philo, Comment, Revoke The Legal License to Kill Construction
Workers, 19 DEPAuL L. REV. 1 (1969) (stating it is common knowledge that
workmen killed in construction work do not receive full compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act for damages they sustain).
Errol Tyler, Comment, Liability of Landowners, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1961) (noting
the early view was that because an employer has no right to control the manner in
which the contractor performs his work, the enterprise should be regarded as the
contractor's, who is in the better position to prevent, administer, and distribute the
risk).
ROB HAILEY
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X. LABOR
In an action by an employee to recover unpaid wages under California Labor
Code section 98, the statute of limitations date used to calculate recoverable
backpay should be the filing date of the claim rather than the date on which the
hearing is held.
Cuadra v. Millan, Supreme Court of California, Decided March 30, 1998, 17 Cal.
4th 855, 952 P.2d 704, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687.
Facts. In separate proceedings, three plaintiffs filed claims against their former
employers under California Labor Code section 98, attempting to recover backpay.
The claims alleged violations of the statutory minimum wage/overtime pay
requirements. The plaintiffs were seeking backpay for the full three-year period
preceding the date their claims were filed with the Labor Commissioner
(commissioner). The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement informed the
plaintiffs that, pursuant to the commissioner's policy, the three-year limitations
period for recovery of backpay would be calculated from the date of their hearings
rather than from the date when the claims were filed. As a result of this policy, the
plaintiffs were awarded from three to seven months less backpay than if the filing
date of their claims had been used for the calculation of wages due.
The plaintiffs filed ajoint petition in superior court, seeking a writ of mandate
ordering the commissioner to use the claim filing date rather than the hearing date
for all calculations of backpay under section 98. At the hearing, counsel for the
commissioner argued that the determination of limitations dates was within the
discretion of the commissioner. The court found that the use of the hearing date,
rather than the filing date, was an abuse of discretion, and granted the writ of
mandate.
The commissioner appealed, but the court of appeal affirmed the judgment of
the lower court. The court reasoned that section 98 hearings (Berman hearings)
were legislatively intended to be an efficient, informal method of resolving claims
without resorting to the court system. Because the commissioner's policy
effectively penalized claimants months or even years of backpay by using the
hearing date rather than the filing date, the court held that the policy did not
effectuate the legislature's intent and upheld the issuance of a writ of mandate.
Holding. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the decision of the court of
appeal, ruling that the commissioner's policy, using the hearing date to determine
the calculation of recoverable back pay in Berman proceedings was an abuse of
discretion. The court reasoned that even though section 98 is silent as to time
limitations for filing claims, the commissioner is implicitly authorized to enact
policies to further the legislative intent of the statute. The commissioner had
already enacted policies adopting the general statutes of limitations for backpay
wage claims contained in California Code of Civil Procedure section 312. Among
these was the adoption of a three-year statute of limitations on claims for wage
liability created by statute, such as the claims in the present case. The major policy
not adopted by the commissioner from the California Code of Civil Procedure was
section 350, the rule that recoverable backpay should be calculated from the date
a suit is filed, rather than from the date the suit is heard. The court determined that
because the commissioner had already enacted a policy using the hearing date to
calculate recoverable backpay, the argument that he did not have power to change
this policy to use the filing date was unpersuasive.
The court tiurther reasoned that because section 98.1(b) provides that the
commissioner shall award any due and unpaid wages, including interest on those
wages, from the date the wages were due and payable, the legislature clearly
intended that claimants should be able to use Berman proceedings to collect all
unpaid wages. The court indicated that this legislative intent is best served by
calculating backpay from the filing date of the claim, in order to minimize any
potential loss of unpaid wages.
The court also addressed the issue by acknowledging that an employee who
files for a Berman hearing will always recover a lesser amount than an employee
with the same claim who files a civil lawsuit. The reason for this discrepancy is
completely due to the commissioner's policy, and in no way due to acts or
omissions of the employee. The court indicated that such a policy frustrates the
remedial intent of the legislation, and therefore is an abuse of discretion.
Finally, the commissioner argued that a writ of mandate should not be issued
because the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law, namely an appeal of the
commissioner's ruling in the court system. The court of appeal rejected this
argument, determining that the remedy would not be adequate because it would
defeat the purpose of Berman hearings by making the proceeding more costly and
time consuming. The supreme court did not agree with this rationale. It
determined that the right to an immediate review by appeal is considered an
adequate remedy unless the parties can show some special circumstances that
would render it inadequate. But the court also decided that because the appeal
would have simply dealt with the merits of the case that had already been decided,
it would accept the court of appeal's decision as to the inadequacy of the remedy
for the purposes of this proceeding. Because this issue was important to a large
part of the workforce, the court wanted to avoid any unnecessary delay in issuing
its decision.
768
[Vol. 26: 683, 1999] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. LAB. CODE § 98 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998) (providing administrative
procedures for recovery of due and payable wages).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 312 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (generally providing
statutes of limitations for civil actions).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 350 (West 1982 & Supo. 1998) (providing that an action
commences on the date the complaint is filed).
Case Law:
Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 743 P.2d
1323,241 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1987) (holding that an administrative agency cannot create
a remedy that the legislature withheld).
Dickey v. Raison Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal. 2d 796, 151 P.2d 505 (1944)
(stating that the labor commissioner may exercise implicit power to efficiently
administer powers expressly granted by statute).
Jones v. Tracy Sch. Dist., 27 Cal. 3d 99, 611 P.2d 441, 165 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1980)
(stating that the court counts back from the filing date to calculate all due and
unpaid amounts earned during the limitation period).
Legal Texts:
41 CAL. JUR. 3D Labor § 12 (1978 & Supp. 1998) (detailing the duties and
responsibilities of the labor commissioner).
4 CAL. JUR. 3D Administrative Law § 320 (1973 & Supp. 1998) (discussing time
requirements for administrative mandamus proceedings).
2 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency & Employment § 292 (9th
ed. 1987 & Supp. 1998) (providing that the labor commissioner may prosecute
actions for backpay and conduct hearings to adjudicate the actions).
3 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions § 407 (4th ed. 1996) (stating that
tolling of statute of limitations is a temporary suspension caused by certain events
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or acts).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
William H. Chamblee, Comment, Administrative Law: Journey Through the
Administrative Process and Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, 16 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 155 (1984) (discussing the increase in regulation and adjudication
through administrative agencies).
James M. Fischer, The Limits of Statutes ofLimitations, 16 Sw. U. L. REv. 1 (1986)
(discussing statutory tolling provisions under the California Code of Civil
Procedure).
Gary G. Mathiason & Paula Champagne, Interrelationship of Administrative,
Local, State, and Federal Procedures, Issue Preclusion and Statute of Limitations
Problems, C780 ALI-ABA 981 (1993) (discussing equitable tolling of the statute
of limitations under California law).
Michael D. Moberly, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage
Payment Remedies, 23 ARiz. ST. L.J. 991 (1991) (discussing whether state statutory
remedies for unpaid wages are preempted by the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938).
Sam Walker, Judicially Created Uncertainly: The Past, Present, and Future of
California Writ of Administrative Mandamus, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 783 (1991)
(discussing the history and present use of administrative mandamus in California).
JOHN CORRINGTON
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XI. PARENT AND CHILD
A biological father does not have a constitutionally protected interest in
establishing a relationship with his child conceived and born during the
mother's marriage to another man; therefore, California Family Code sections
7611 and 7630 may constitutionally be applied to preclude an alleged biological
father from establishing his paternity of a child born during the mother's
marriage to another man.
Dawn D. v. Superior Ct., Supreme Court of California, Decided April 6, 1998, 17
Cal. 4th 932, 952 P.2d 1139, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871.
Facts. California Family Code section 7611, subdivision (a) provides that a man
will be presumed to be the natural father of a child if he "and the child's natural
mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment,
declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a judgment of separation is entered by
the court." Subdivisions (b) and (c) establish more complex means by which a man
may be the presumed father of a child, involving attempted and subsequent
marriage to the mother. Family Code section 7630 states that "[a] child, the child's
natural mother, or a man presumed to be the child's father under subdivision (a),
(b), or (c) of Section 7611, may bring an action.., at any time for the purpose of
declaring the existence of the father and child relationship presumed . . ."
(emphasis added). The alleged biological father in this case, Jerry, challenged the
application of these statutes, which denied him the right to establish paternity of his
alleged son.
Dawn D. and Frank F. married in June 1989. In January 1995, Dawn
separated from Frank and began living with Jerry K. Dawn became pregnant the
following month. In April 1995, she moved out of Jerry's home and resumed
living with her husband, Frank. In August 1995, Jerry filed a complaint to
establish a parental relationship with the then unborn child. Frank and Dawn
continued to live together as husband and wife through the resolution of the action
and the child had lived with them since its birth. Jerry attempted to negotiate a
child support and visitation arrangement with Dawn and Frank, but they never
effectuated such an agreement.
Dawn moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that California law
recognizes only one natural father for any child and that Jerry did not have standing
under the California Family Code to seek blood testing to establish parentage. The
trial court denied Dawn's motion, finding that because Jerry had done all he could
to demonstrate a commitment to his parental responsibilities, he had established
"due process rights" and should be permitted to try to establish biological
parentage. The court thus granted Jerry's motion for blood testing. The court of
appeal denied Dawn's petition to compel the trial court to vacate its order. The
California Supreme Court granted review to consider whether the presumption
created by Family Code section 7611 and the standing provisions of section 7630
may constitutionally be applied to preclude an alleged biological father from
establishing his paternity of a child born during the mother's marriage to another
man.
Holding. The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of
appeal, holding that Jerry did not establish a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in being allowed to form a parent-child relationship with a child born while
the mother was married to another man and that application to Jerry of Family
Code sections 7611 and 7630 did not, therefore, deprive him of due process.
The court first noted that Dawn's husband, Frank, was the presumed father
of the child under section 7611. Jerry, on the other hand, did not meet any of the
statutory provisions for presumed fatherhood. While the statutory presumptions
are rebuttable, section 7630 limits standing to bring a paternity action to the child's
natural mother, the child, or a presumed father, thus precluding Jerry from bringing
a paternity action. Jerry thus argued that a biological father has a liberty interest,
protected by substantive due process mandates, in being permitted to establish a
parent-child relationship with his offspring.
In evaluating his claim, the court noted that California case law demands that
"reasonableness of a statutory limitation on a right to offer proof of parentage"
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. In doing so, however, the court
recognized that it must be guided by the methodology developed by the United
States Supreme Court for deciding whether an asserted interest is a fundamental
liberty. It outlined that inquiry as follows: 1) the court must make a "careful
description" of the asserted liberty interest; 2) the court, informed by the nation's
history, traditions, and conscience, must determine whether the interest is
fundamental; and 3) if the court decides that it is fundamental, it must weigh the
state's countervailing interest to determine if it justifies infringement upon that
liberty. Again, this will require a complex balancing on a case-by-case basis.
Applying this framework, the court described Jerry's asserted liberty interest as that
of "establishing a relationship with his child born to a woman married to another
man at the time of the child's conception and birth."
In determining whether that interest is a fundamental liberty, the court
considered the 1989 Supreme Court plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
498 U.S. 110 (1989). In Michael H., the plurality held that the biological father of
a child born to a woman married to another man had no protected liberty interest
in continuing his relationship with that child, even though he had lived with the
mother and child for almost a year. Three dissenting justices in that case concluded
that the biological father's actual relationship with the child engendered a
protected liberty interest in a continuing relationship with that child. The
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California Supreme Court in this case thus concluded that "at least seven of the
nine high court justices in Michael H. expressly rejected the view that an unwed
father's biological link to a child alone gives rise to a protected liberty interest."
Because Jerry never had an actual relationship with the child, the court concluded
that his claim must fail.
The court addressed the dissent's contention that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), supported finding a
constitutionally protected liberty interest for Jerry. In Lehr, an unwed mother later
married another man who sought to adopt the child. The Court held that due
process entitled the unwed natural father to notice and a hearing before the child
could be adopted. The California Supreme Court here distinguished that case as
involving two unwed parents at the time of the child's birth. Further, the court
noted that the Court's subsequent decision in Michael H. resolved any ambiguities
in Lehr in favor of the state.
Finally, the court rejected Jerry's contention that the state has an interest in
an accurate determination of biological paternity. It distinguished the authority
Jerry offered, Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529
(1979), as inapplicable because it addressed only the rights of defendants in
paternity actions prosecuted by the state, not those in which, as here, the man is
actively seeking to establish his paternity of a child born to a woman married to
another man who is the statutorily presumptive father. Because Jerry was unable
to establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the court did not reach step
three of the above-mentioned analysis and concluded that application of sections
7611 and 7630 to Jerry did not deprive him of due process.
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XlI. TORTS
In cases where the victim of intentional destruction of evidence, committed by
a party to the underlying cause of action to which the evidence is pertinent,
knows or has constructive knowledge of the alleged act before the trial
pertaining to the underlying action, a new tort remedy will not be created.
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Bowyer, Supreme Court of California, Decided May 11,
1998, 18 Cal. 4th 1, 954 P.2d 511, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248.
Facts. Kristopher Schon Bowyer, the plaintiff, was allegedly injured during birth
due to oxygen deprivation. Through his guardian ad litem, the plaintiff brought a
medical malpractice action against the defendant, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center.
During the discovery phase of trial, Bowyer' s attorney attempted to obtain from the
defendant copies of the plaintiff's medical records. The defendant claimed it was
unable to locate certain records, including fetal monitoring strips that recorded the
child's heartbeat during labor.
The plaintiff then filed an amended complaint, adding a cause of action for
intentional spoliation of evidence. In this complaint, the plaintiff sought punitive
damages, alleging that the defendant had intentionally destroyed the evidence
requested during discovery to prohibit the plaintiff from succeeding in the
underlying malpractice cause of action. The court granted review to determine
whether it should recognize a tort remedy for the intentional destruction of
evidence by a party to the underlying cause of action.
Holding. Addressing a dispositive issue not raised by the parties below that did
not turn on the facts of the case, the court held that a tort remedy will not be created
for intentional spoliation of evidence, committed by a party to the underlying action
to which the evidence is pertinent, when the victim knew or should have known of
the alleged destruction before the trial on the primary cause of action. Against the
plaintiff's objection, the court held that even though the existence of the tort was
not an issue raised in the courts below, its power of decision extended to the entire
case.
The court condemned the act of intentional destruction of evidence, but stated
that this act alone was not sufficient justification for a new tort remedy. In
determining whether or not to create a tort remedy, the court focused on the narrow
issue in the case. Specifically, the court asked whether a tort remedy for such
conduct would produce social benefits beyond those created through present
remedies. The California Supreme Court recognized its past decisions involving
litigation-related misconduct where the court preferred imposing sanctions within
the underlying lawsuit rather than creating new tort remedies. The potential for a
new tort remedy to increase costly and time consuming litigation was a central
reason behind the court's holding.
Analogizing perjury to the issue in the instant case of intentional spoliation
of evidence, the court found another reason for not creating a new tort remedy.
Both perjury and intentional spoliation of evidence hinder the search for truth and
justice, the court held. Relying on a previous decision, the court acknowledged that
there was no civil remedy in damages against a witness who commits perjury while
testifying. The court reasoned that the denial of tort remedies in these cases rested
upon a concern for the finality of adjudication. This interest was persuasively
explained when the court cited Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 135 (1891), which held
that "[e]ndless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be
worse than occasional miscarriages of justice ......
The court noticed the number of non-tort remedies that were developed to
discourage and penalize the intentional destruction of evidence, including the
evidentiary inference set forth in Evidence Code section 413, and the number of
strong sanctions for such conduct under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.
The court also recognized sanctions that could be imposed on lawyers involved in
such spoliation conduct, and that modem civil discovery statutes encourage lawyers
to take control of their clients' evidence for the sake of preserving potentially
pertinent evidence. Furthermore, the court listed another remedy found in Penal
Code section 135 that creates criminal penalties for spoliation.
Next, the court realized that the uncertainty of harm in spoliation cases would
fosterjury speculation problems. Because the jury would not know the content and
significance of the destroyed evidence, the jury could only hypothesize as to its
effect on the fundamental cause of action.
Finally, the court focused on the costs imposed by a tort remedy in these
situations. Among its concerns, the majority focused on the indirect costs imposed
by erroneous spoliation determinations. Specifically, persons would be forced to
preserve, for uncertain periods, documents of no apparent value so that they might
avoid the likelihood of spoliation liability. Also, the costs of creating a new tort
remedy would impose upon the courts and defendants the hassle and inefficiency
of disputing unmeritorious spoliation claims.
In conclusion, the court held that, due to the remedies already available in first
party spoliation cases, no tort remedy will be available for such conduct when the
victim, or plaintiff here, knows or should know of the alleged spoliation before the
trial of the underlying action.
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XI1. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
A. An employee's injury must occur in the course of his employment and by
reason of a condition or incident of his employment to be covered under a
workers' compensation plan; thus, an employee's deadly injury from a bacterial
infection contracted in the hospital while receiving medical treatment for a
heart attack suffered during a business trip, did not occur in the course of his
employment or by reason of a condition or an incident of that employment and,
accordingly, was not compensable under the workers' compensation law.
LaTourette v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., Supreme Court of California,
Decided March 12, 1998, 17 Cal. 4th 644, 951 P.2d 1184, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217.
Facts. California Labor Code section 3600(a) creates an employer's workers'
compensation liability for an employee's injury or death if it "ar[ose] out of and in
the course of the employment." Subdivision (2) further requires that "the employee
[be] performing services growing out of and incidental to [the] employment" to
create such a liability. In October, 1990, Mr. LaTourette was on a business trip in
Reno, Nevada for his employer, the Long Beach Community College District.
While attending a conference there, he suffered a heart attack caused by a
preexisting medical condition and was hospitalized. In the course of the treatment
in the Reno hospital, LaTourette developed a bacterial infection. On November 12,
1990, he died during an emergency open heart surgery, apparently due to
complications caused by the infection. In December, 1990, the petitioner,
decedent's widow, filed a workers' compensation claim, seeking temporary
disability, the costs of medical treatment, burial expenses, and death benefits. The
petitioner alleged that LaTourette died of a heart attack due to work-related stress
while attending the conference. The workers' compensation judge concluded that
the petitioner had produced insufficient evidence of stress and held that the
decedent "did not sustain injury arising out of and occurring in the course of...
employment to his heart resulting in death on November 12, 1990." The petitioner
appealed to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, which denied the petition
for reconsideration, adopting the workers' compensation judge's finding that even
though the decedent had been a "commercial traveler," the death did not arise out
of the employment.
The petitioner thereafter sought a writ of review in the California Court of
Appeal, which was summarily denied. The Supreme Court of California granted
review and remanded the case to the court of appeal with directions to vacate the
denial and issue a writ of review. The court of appeal affirmed the Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board's decision, holding that the decedent acted within
the course of his employment at the time of the heart attack but that there was no
causal connection between the injury leading to his death and the employment. The
court rejected the petitioner's argument that she was only required to establish that
the need for treatment of the original injury was a reasonable expectation of a
commercial traveler and therefore arising out of and within the course of the
employment. The California Supreme Court granted review to consider whether
the medical treatment an employee receives for a nonoccupational heart condition
during a business trip is compensable under the workers' compensation laws.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that the self-directed seeking of medical treatment during the course of
employment does not create an employer's liability under the workers'
compensation laws when the medical conditions neither arose out of the
employment nor were a condition or incident of employment. Consequently, the
court further held that workers' compensation liability does not arise when an
employee contracts and is injured by a nonoccupational disease during the course
of his employment.
To receive workers' compensation, the applicant must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence the reasonable probability of industrial causation.
Labor Code section 3600 requires that the injury "aris[e] out of and in the course
of the employment," -setting forth a two prong test. The first part of the test
requires a showing that the injury occurred "in the course of the employment."
Consequently, the applicant must show that he acted under the express or implied
authorization of his employer. The second part of the test mandates the applicant
to show that the injury "ar[ose] out of' the employment. Hence, the injury must
"occur by reason of a condition or incident of [the] employment" and, accordingly,
requires a causal connection between injury and employment. The court explained
that when an employee travels on behalf of his employer, he is regarded as a
"commercial traveler" and is acting within the course of employment during the
entire period of his travel. But the court emphasized that the remaining conditions
set forth in section 3600 of the Labor Code equally applied to "commercial
travelers."
Accordingly, the court found that commercial travelers were also subject to
the general rules governing injury from a non-occupational disease-an injury that
is held not to arise out of the employment and is, consequently, noncompensable.
The court recapped the rules of nonoccupational diseases by emphasizing that no
causal connection is established by the contraction of a nonoccupational disease
and the person's employment. Two exceptions apply to the general rule of
noncompensability for nonoccupational diseases. "First, if the employment
subjects the employee to an increased risk compared to that of the general public,
the injury is compensable. Second, if the immediate cause of the injury is an
intervening human agency or instrumentality of the employment, the injury is
compensable." The court made clear that if neither one of the exceptions applied,
the applicant for workers' compensation could not seek compensation for a
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nonoccupational disease contracted during the course of employment.
Accordingly, the decedent's injury from a bacterial infection, which
apparently resulted in his death, was a nonoccupational injury that is
noncompensable, even though the heart attack occurred "in the course of the
employment." The court reasoned that the petitioner failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the decedent's injury from the bacterial
infection occurred "in the course of employment," or that it "arose out of the
employment." The court rejected the argument "that obtaining medical treatment
for a nonoccupational disease is a 'reasonable expectation of the commercial
traveler's needs."' The court reasoned that the medical treatment sought by the
decedent for his preexisting medical condition was not an activity a healthy traveler
would be exposed to "in the course of employment" and was "'a purely personal
undertaking,' outside the scope of the employment." The court further concluded
that neither one of the two exceptions to the noncompensability of nonoccupational
diseases applied in this case because neither did a special risk of infection exist, nor
did the decedent's employer require or authorize him to undergo treatment in Reno,
Nevada. Because the decedent's injury did not occur in the course of his
employment or by reason of a condition or incident of his employment, he was not
covered under the employer's workers' compensation plan.
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B. When the owner of a residential dwelling purchases comprehensive
personal liability insurance, the insurance policy must provide coverage for
workers' compensation benefits for any person employed by the owner
whose duties are incidental to the maintenance of the dwelling, who worked
more than 52 hours and earned more than $100 during the 90 days
proceeding the injury.
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., Supreme
Court of California, Decided December 18, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 1187, 947 P.2d 795,
69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 602.
Facts. Leonard Sr. and his wife purchased a homeowner's insurance policy from
State Farm Insurance. The policy covered comprehensive personal liability and
included an "Additional Coverage Endorsement," as required by Insurance Code
section 11590, for workers' compensation benefits with respect to "residence
employees." "Residence employee" was defined in the policy as an employee who
"performs duties... in connection with the maintenance or use of the residence
premises." The additional coverage endorsement stated that "[a] residence
employee is covered if during the 90 calendar days immediately before the injury
the employee has (a) actually been engaged in such employment by the insured for
no less than 52 hours; and (b) earned no less than one hundred dollars in wages."
Leonard Sr. employed his son, Leonard Jr., to perform repairs on one of his
residential properties. Leonard Jr. injured his back in the course of this
employment. He filed an application for determination of a workers' compensation
claim. State Farm contended that Leonard Jr. was barred from recovering workers'
compensation benefits under Labor Code section 3352, subdivision (a), because he
was the son of his employer. Leonard Jr. argued that he was entitled to such
benefits as a "residence employee" under the policy.
After a hearing on the subject, the workers' compensation referee issued an
opinion concluding that Leonard Jr. was a covered employee under the worker's
compensation law. State Farm petitioned for reconsideration, but the Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board denied reconsideration and adopted the referee's
opinion. State Farm then filed a writ of review. The court of appeal held that the
homeowners did not elect to extend insurance coverage to their son by purchasing
the "additional coverage endorsement." The court of appeal invalidated the
decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board. The Supreme Court of
California granted review to determine whether an injured person is entitled to
workers' compensation benefits when it is a family member's policy of
comprehensive personal liability insurance.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that when a residential dwelling owner purchases comprehensive
personal liability insurance, the policy must provide coverage for worker's
compensation benefits for any person employed by the owner whose duties are
incidental to the maintenance of the dwelling. The coverage does not apply,
however, according to Labor Code section 3352, if the person employed worked
less than 52 hours and earned less than $100 during the ninety days preceding the
injury. The court reasoned that under Insurance Code section 11590, the term
"employee" is interpreted more broadly than under the general workers'
compensation law, which excludes "any person employed by his or her parent,
spouse, or child." The broader interpretation is used for comprehensive personal
liability insurance to make the coverage truly "comprehensive," the insured is
protected against liability for damages and workers' compensation law even when
claims are bought by a family member. The court, in interpreting workers'
compensation statutes, construes them liberally to cover persons injured in the
course of employment.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the appellate court's argument that the
Insurance Code section should be read to incorporate Labor Code section 3352(a),
which would exclude from the definition of "employee" any person employed by
his or her parent, spouse or child. The court further noted that Labor Code section
4151 even permits the "election" of workers' compensation benefits for any person
not defined as an "employee" and who does not satisfy the hours and wage
requirements of Labor Code section 3352, and any person employed by a parent,
spouse, or child.
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